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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
From Pervert to Predator: Law, Medicine, Media, and the Construction of Contemporary Sexual 
Deviance  
 
by 
 
Rebecca Ann DiBennardo 
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 
Professor Abigail Saguy, Chair 
 
 This Dissertation examines how cultural and legal interactions shift the meaning and 
implications of “predatory” sexual behavior. Specifically, it explores how lawmaking processes, 
media coverage, and therapeutic jurisprudence have shifted the way that sexually predatory 
behavior is categorized and defined in California’s 1996 Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act. 
Drawing on fieldwork; interviews with experts working in law, medicine, politics, and advocacy; 
and legal and media content analysis, I develop three substantive chapters exploring different 
institutions’ impact on this law. Chapter Two of the dissertation introduces the SVP Act and 
examines changes to the law made via Proposition 83, a 2006 voter-initiated statute. Drawing on 
comparative analysis of legislative history, text, and debates, this chapter demonstrates how the 
Proposition system allowed for the incorporation of rhetoric that the legislative system did not, 
justifying different legal penalties for sexual predators at each point in time. Chapter Three uses 
 iii 
content analysis of 323 Los Angeles Times articles about sexual predators over the span of 25 
years to examine shifting representations of sexual predator victims, crimes, and offenders. 
Chapter Four examines how interactions between legal and medical actors and systems transform 
SVP treatment into punishment. Taken together, these chapters illustrate how different aspects of 
law, medicine, and popular opinion interact to construct sexual predators as increasingly 
monstrous, and provide a framework to begin to understand the impact and implications of this 
construction for both sex offenders and victims. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 Sociological research, particularly in the area of criminology, largely ignores the 
contemporary sex offender. Yet, in addition to comprising an integral part of the United States 
criminal justice system, sex offenders occupy a unique sociological space at the intersection of 
sexualities, culture, and institutions. Unlike most historically marginalized groups, they are not 
necessarily innocent—they are denied rights and opportunities because they have committed (or 
are accused of committing) sex crimes, some quite severe and violent. The visceral societal 
reaction to these crimes is almost unparalleled. More so than other “criminals,” sex offenders 
instill fear and revulsion; they engender little-to-no sympathy, and they are frequent political 
scapegoats. In the case of sex offenders, “sex changes the nature of crime and of criminal 
jurisprudence alike” (Hoppe and Halperin 2018). The way in which sex offenders and offenses 
are defined and regulated, then, provides the opportunity to examine how legal and cultural 
interactions shape how we understand sex and sexual violence at various points in time. 
Accordingly, this dissertation examines how cultural and legal interactions shift the 
meaning and implications of “predatory” sexual behavior, using California’s 1996 Sexually 
Violent Predator (SVP) Act as a case study. The SVP Act defined and categorized sexually 
predatory behavior as a form mental illness, warranting indefinite and involuntary commitment 
of Sexual Predators to Coalinga State Hospital. Through fieldwork; interviews with experts 
working in law, medicine, politics, and advocacy; and legal and media content analysis, the 
project explores how aspects of law, medicine, and popular opinion interact to construct sexual 
predators as increasingly monstrous, justifying expanding punishment and intense focus on this 
category of offenders. This study is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of sex offender 
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laws or sexual violence, but rather to provide a framework to begin to understand the impact and 
implications of this construction for both sex offenders and victims.   
 
Background on California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act 
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) laws emerged in the 1990’s amongst a profusion of new 
sex offender laws and regulations in the United States, including expanding public registration 
and notification, extended sentencing, and longer probation sentences for offenders convicted of 
sexual crimes (Meiners 2009, Pickett, Mancini, and Mears 2013). SVP laws deem certain types 
of offenders “mentally disordered;” possessing sexual pathologies that make them predisposed to 
continue offending (for example, pedophilia and sexual sadism). This mental diagnosis justifies 
their indefinite confinement in mental hospitals after they serve criminal sentences.  
California’s enacted its Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act in 1996, classifying 
Sexually Violent Predators as “[people] convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or 
more victims, and/[or] who ha[ve] a diagnosed mental disorder that makes them a danger to the 
health and safety of others, in that it is likely that [they] will engage in sexually violent predatory 
behavior” (D’Orazio et al. 2009). Courts assign SVP designations for repeat offenses the law 
statutorily defines as forceful, violent, or menacing (for example: rape or sodomy). Alternatively, 
the law automatically considers offenders who commit any sex crimes against victims under the 
age of 14 eligible for SVP designation.  
 The term “predatory” in this case refers to offenses that identify and target victims (such as 
child abduction and molestation), as well as a general incapability for self-control that leads to 
likely re-offense. The latter, combined with the associated mental disorder, justifies mandatory 
commitment to mental hospitals (legally termed civil commitment) after SVPs have served 
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criminal penalties. These laws are controversial in part because many legal scholars argue that 
civil commitment violates both double jeopardy and due process (Brakel & Cavanaugh 2000). In 
2006, voter-approved Proposition 83 (commonly referred to as “Jessica’s Law”), modified 
existing SVP statutes to include increased penalties such as lifetime residency restrictions, 
mandatory GPS monitoring, and enhanced sentencing, including indefinite civil confinement. 
In contrast to criminal laws, which are designed to punish various crimes, civil 
commitment is designed to regulate behavior and prevent future harm, often imposing mandatory 
commitment for mental illness, developmental disability, or substance addiction. In this case, 
offenders first serve criminal penalties, and, shortly before release, those convicted of sexual 
offenses are evaluated to identify potential SVP qualification. Qualifying inmates undergo a 
series of evaluations by licensed psychiatrists or psychologists, and, if they are determined to 
meet the SVP criteria, are referred to the district attorney or county counsel of the county where 
the current controlling offense occurred.  
At this point, inmates must go through civil commitment hearing that determines whether 
there are sufficient facts to designate them an SVP and confine them at Coalinga State Hospital 
(CHS), a California facility built in 2005 specifically to house and treat SVPs. Individuals remain 
in custody at Coalinga while awaiting this hearing. During this time, they may engage in 
treatment if they wish (D’Orazio et al. 2009). Often, SVPs remain in the facility for years 
awaiting trial, either due to administrative backlog, legal advice, or a variety of other factors 
(May 2018). The SVP hearing can be a judge or a jury trial, and to be determined an SVP, either 
must decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual meets SVP criteria (jury decisions 
must be unanimous). Those found to be SVPs are sent back to CHS, where it is suggested that 
they participate in treatment, and they can petition the court for release on a yearly basis. 
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Civil commitment laws rely on the provision of treatment for Constitutional legitimacy: 
legally speaking, SVPs are confined for the sake of public safety while they undergo treatment 
for their disorder(s) (Janus 2004). Treatment, however, is voluntary, because, in accordance with 
the SVP Act, the state cannot mandate that offenders participate (Miller 2010). Yet, without 
successfully completing treatment, patients are rarely, if ever, eligible for release. Even when 
they do participate in treatment, “success” is rare: by 2006, less than 10% of SVPs nationally had 
been released (Gookin 2007). 
 
 
Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter Two of this dissertation introduces the 1996 Sexual Predator (SVP) Act and 
examines changes to the law made via Proposition 83, a 2006 voter-initiated statute. Proposition 
83 significantly changed the SVP Act by reclassifying all crimes against children under the age 
of 14 as predatory, reducing qualifying offenses from two to one, and changing civil 
commitment from two-year terms to indefinite. The 2006 changes to the SVP law were produced 
by a dramatically different political process than that which produced the 1996 law. Lawmakers 
proposing the 1996 SVP Act introduced the bill as a draft to the legislature—debating, 
modifying, and eventually putting it to the California Assembly for a vote. In contrast, 
Proposition 83 was initially proposed to the legislature as a bill, but rejected due to 
constitutionality and budget concerns. Rather than rewrite or modify it, lawmakers instead left it 
intact, removed it from the legislature, and used the initiative process to qualify the bill for direct 
placement on the 2006 California electoral ballot as a Proposition. The law passed, implementing 
changes to the SVP Act that fundamentally altered its core components, making the law 
substantially more punitive and heavily focused on child victims. 
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Drawing on comparative analysis of legislative history, text, and debates, this chapter 
examines how the Proposition system allowed for the incorporation of rhetoric that the 
legislative system did not, justifying different legal penalties for sexual predators at each point in 
time. Ultimately, I find that legislators in 2006 used the ballot initiative system to circumvent 
traditional legislative processes and enact changes via popular vote that they had not been able to 
make a year earlier through the legislative process. I contend that part of the reason why the 
ballot system could produce these changes is that it created a space for a rhetoric of child 
victims, which may have helped to convince voters to approve a more punitive law. In contrast, 
legislators in 1996 worked within existing legislative constraints, relying on a more balanced 
rhetoric of risk management to gain support for and implement the law. These results 
demonstrate how the use of popular democratic systems may be used to heighten public 
emotions in the service of creating more punitive laws.  
In addition to legal and political institutions, media constitute an important cultural 
institution through which meanings of the sexually predatory are filtered, shaped, and reflected. 
Correspondingly, Chapter Three examines how news media represent sexual predator victims, 
crimes, and offenders, constructing images of the sexually predatory in the process. Drawing on 
content analysis of 323 Los Angeles Times articles published between 1990 and 2015 that use the 
term “sexual predator” anywhere in their text, I demonstrate that aged and gendered narratives 
contribute key dynamics to the sexual predator template. Stories about the youngest victims 
encompass more sexual violence, graphic descriptions of that violence, more male victims, and 
the oldest offenders. News media use these same child narratives as a rhetorical tool to 
emphasize the “predatory” nature of offenders and justify retributory violence or harsh legal 
punishment. In contrast, narratives about adult victims (which often originate from legal and 
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police discourse) focus mainly on women, often framing them as responsible for their 
victimization, and effectively removing them from predator discourse. These narratives often 
build off of police reports, court cases, and statements by politicians, indicating how different 
institutional interactions impact representations of victims and violence.  
 Chapter Four further interrogates the role of institutional interactions by examining how 
the interaction of medicine and law transforms medical treatment of sexual predators into 
punishment. Existing literature argues that Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) laws, which confine 
and treat various “mentally disordered” sex offenders for indefinite periods of time, constitute 
punishment disguised as medical treatment (Douard 2008, Janus 2006). Yet we know little about 
how SVP treatment and evaluation processes function, or how medical-legal interactions 
structure treatment environments in punitive ways. Using observation of one three-week-long 
Sexually Violent Predator trial; in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 12 medical and legal 
SVP experts; 70 hours of participant observation over 24 months of at a statewide sex offender 
management coalition and sex offender advocacy group; and analysis of primary documents 
relating to California’s SVP Program, I examine SVP treatment processes at interpersonal and 
institutional levels.  
I find that three factors transform treatment into punishment: 1) institutional 
inefficiencies, such as staffing shortages and treatment inconsistencies, that make accessing and 
successfully completing treatment almost impossible, 2) stigma created by the sexual predator 
label that impacts treatment processes, and 3) the subordination of medical and clinical priorities 
to legal and punitive priorities. This chapter demonstrates how medical-legal interactions, both 
institutional and interpersonal, can shape treatment environments in punitive ways. I conclude 
my analysis by discussing how the therapeutic discourse of SVP laws has begun to expand to 
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other “undesirable” populations, and the broader implications of using treatment as both 
mechanism and a justification for the exclusion of “unsolvable” social problems. 
 
** 
Overall, this project demonstrates how social, legal, and political institutions have constructed 
the sexual predator as a child predator, which justifies disproportionate attention to sexual 
predation compared to more pervasive types of sexual violence, such as rape, assault, and sexual 
harassment of adult women. This framing negatively impacts adult female victims by 
marginalizing and diminishing their experiences, child victims by exploiting and revictimizing 
them with extreme representations of sexual violence, and sex offenders by justifying their 
punishment and stigmatization. More broadly, the hyperbole of this discourse effectively 
disallows substantive discussion about the larger societal factors that perpetuate and contribute to 
sexual violence, diverting attention from more pressing and relevant social concerns.
  8 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Politics and Punishment: Emotions, Popular Democracy, and California’s Sexually Violent  
 
Predator Act 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
In 1996, California enacted the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act, a law that civilly commits 
the most “predatory” sex offenders to mental hospitals after their criminal sentences. Ten years 
later, Proposition 83, a voter-initiated statute, significantly changed this law by reclassifying all 
crimes against children under the age of 14 as predatory, reducing SVP qualifying offenses from 
two to one, and making civil commitment indefinite. How and why were these changes made at 
that time and not earlier? Drawing on comparative legal analysis, I find that politicians in 
2006 used the ballot initiative system to circumvent legislative processes, enacting changes via 
popular vote they unable to pass through the legislature. I contend that part of the reason the 
ballot system could produce these changes was by creating a space for child victim rhetoric that 
convinced voters to approve a more punitive law. In contrast, legislators worked within existing 
constraints to implement the law in 1996, relying on a more balanced rhetoric of risk 
management. These results demonstrate how popular democratic systems may be used to 
heighten public emotions in order to create more punitive laws. I conclude by discussing the 
implications of these results for criminal law in the US. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 25 years, sex offender regulations in the United States multiplied, 
expanded, and became increasingly punitive. Among the most controversial contemporary sex 
offender regulations is mandatory civil commitment, which sentences offenders deemed most 
“predatory” to indefinite confinement in mental hospitals, immediately and directly after serving 
their criminal penalties. California became one of the earliest adopters of a civil commitment 
statute in 1996, when the legislature enacted a law called the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) 
Act. Ten years later, Proposition 83, a voter-initiated statute, significantly amplified the SVP Act 
by reclassifying all crimes against children under the age of 14 as sexually violent, reducing SVP 
qualifying offenses from two to one, and making civil commitment indefinite (Mathews 2008).  
The 2006 changes to the SVP law were produced by a dramatically different political 
process than that which produced the 1996 law. Lawmakers proposing the 1996 SVP Act 
introduced the bill as a draft to the legislature—debating, modifying, and eventually putting it to 
the California Assembly for a vote. In contrast, Proposition 83 was initially proposed to the 
legislature as a bill, but rejected due to constitutionality and budget concerns. Rather than rewrite 
or modify it, lawmakers instead left it intact, removed it from the legislature, and used the 
initiative process to qualify the bill for direct placement on the 2006 California electoral ballot as 
a Proposition. The law passed, implementing changes to the SVP Act that fundamentally altered 
its core components, making the law substantially more punitive and heavily focused on child 
victims. 
Drawing on comparative analysis of legislative history, text, and debates, this paper 
examines how the Proposition system allows for the incorporation of rhetoric that the legislative 
system does not, justifying different legal penalties for sexual predators at each point in time. 
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Existing work theorizes that a number of factors contribute to shifting and expanding sex 
offender regulation, including an increased focus on child-victims (Pickett, Mancini, and Mears 
2013), stereotypes about “monstrous” sex offenders (Lancaster 2011), and risk management 
models that classify and sort sex offenders by dangerousness and likelihood to reoffend (Douard 
2008). Less discussed is the way that political processes intersect with these factors, in particular 
the ways in which different political environments may impact the extent to which (and how) 
narratives of victims, offenders, and risk are incorporated into law. This is particular importance 
as the use of the voter initiative system to legislate crime grows (Donovan and Karp 2006). 
While emotional rhetoric always underlies sex offender policy making (Lynch 2002), the 
initiative system’s lack of legislative oversight and direct voter participation may facilitate 
unique appeals to fear and demonization that traditional policy making processes do not.  
Ultimately, I find that legislators in 2006 used the ballot initiative system to circumvent 
traditional legislative processes and enact changes via popular vote that they had not been able to 
make a year earlier through the legislative process. I contend that part of the reason why the 
ballot system could produce these changes is that it created a space for a rhetoric of child 
victims, which may have helped to convince voters to approve a more punitive law. In contrast, 
legislators in 1996 worked within existing legislative constraints, relying on a more balanced 
rhetoric of risk management to gain support for and implement the law. These results 
demonstrate how the use of popular democratic systems may be used to heighten public 
emotions in the service of creating more punitive laws. I focus on California, a state that often 
leads the way in policy for the United States, concluding by discussing the potential implications 
of this finding for changing sex offender laws and criminal law in the United States more 
broadly. 
  11 
Theories of Victims, Offenders, and Risk in the Expansion of Sex Crime Legislation 
Sex offender laws make up a core component of changing sentencing law and policy in 
the United States over the past 30 years (Hobson 2005, Lancaster 2011). The majority of such 
laws add penalties and regulations to those already broadly considered sex offenders. These 
include the growth and publication of sex offender registries, additional jail time, and longer 
probation sentences for offenders convicted of sexual crimes (Meiners 2009). Picket et al. (2013) 
highlight three theories that underlie the increasing regulation of sex crimes: the victim-oriented 
concerns model, the sex offender stereotypes model, and the risk management concerns model.  
The victim-oriented concerns model grew from what Lancaster (2011) argues were a few 
high-profile 1980’s sex panics regarding satanic ritual abuse (and later proven to be made up). 
These events shifted popular focus towards child sexual abuse, while instilling permanent 
anxieties about the pervasive risk of sexual assault to children (Krinsky 2016). According to 
Lancaster (2011) and other scholars (Bevacqua 2000, Scoular 2010), the resulting frenzy set the 
scene for the growth of “moral crusades” that prioritized and emphasized the victimization of 
children by identifying sexual crimes against children as the most egregious and child victims as 
those in need of the most protection (Fischel 2016). Often, they did so by advocating for 
“tribute” laws, named after murdered or sexually assaulted children (for example: Megan’s Law, 
the Adam Walsh Act, and Jessica’s Law) (Simon 2000). Douard and Schultz (2008) argue that 
the panic over child sexual abuse shifted the focus of the law away from traditional notions of 
protection for the accused, towards the notion that the law’s function is to protect victims—“The 
law itself is now being shaped by the innocent imaginary child that must be protected.” 
Victim-focused narratives go hand in hand with stereotypes of “monstrous” sex 
offenders. Lancaster (2011) points out that, just as child victims cause panic, so do people who 
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“look, act, or talk like our vaguely sketched stereotype of what constitutes a sex offender.” Such 
stereotypes include ideas that all sex offender are pedophiles (Lancaster 2011, Levine 2006), that 
they are untreatable or unable to be reformed (Leon 2011), and that they tend to be strangers to 
their victims (Greer 2003, Lancaster 2011). Such notions perpetuate harsh punishment rather 
than rehabilitation, which appears fruitless in this context (Douard 2008). 
In addition to victim and offender narratives, the increasing use of risk assessment and 
management, which identifies and classifies groups of sexual offenders based on their imminent 
danger to themselves and to others (Haggerty and Ericson 2000, Garland 2001), is often 
theorized as contributing to expanding sex offender regulation. Despite noted concerns with 
predicting and evaluating violent behavior (Faust and Ziskin 1988, Bjørkly 1995, Boccaccini et 
al. 2010, Hughes 1996), this approach is presented as a scientific, valid, and rational way to 
approach the legislation of sexual violence (Sweet 2018). “Governing through risk” (Baker and 
Simon 2010) drives punitive trends in carceral policy, often under the guise of efficiency (Vogler 
2018).  
This guise of efficiency is important because victim-based and sex offender stereotype 
narratives function differently than do risk assessment narratives. While the former rely upon 
overt emotions—cultural anger and moral outrage (Herdt 2009, Irvine 2008)—the latter is often 
presented as neutral or devoid of emotions; an objective way to make sex offender policy (Janus 
and Prentky 2008). However, Douard (2008) argues that narratives of risk management in fact 
serve a similar function to cultural narratives that frame sex offenders as monstrous, branding 
them unable to control their impulses, unworthy of sympathy, and increasingly subject to the 
removal of legal rights. Risk management thus works in tandem with the logic of the “degraded 
other,” ensuring both that sex offenders are sorted according to risk, and that the appropriate 
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solution to that risk is to identify and isolate them (Janus and Prentky 2008, Simon 1998, Weitzer 
2010).  
Civil commitment laws such as California’s SVP Act (both the initial and current 
version) rely almost exclusively on risk assessment, classifying offenders into the Sexually 
Violent Predator category based on actuarial models that evaluate future dangerousness and 
propensity to reoffend. In contrast to criminal laws, which are designed to punish various crimes, 
laws that reside in the civil domain are designed to regulate behavior and prevent future harm. 
The latter has a lower standard of proof and the penalties imposed are not criminal (while many 
civil cases result in financial settlements, those relating to mental health often result in 
mandatory commitment for mental illness, developmental disability, or substance addiction). 
Most importantly, while criminal law is more constrained by the Constitution and Constitutional 
issues, civil cases can take into account potential future crimes, be applied retroactively, and can 
be brought after criminal punishment without counting as double jeopardy (Janus 2006). 
 
Changing Legislative Processes and the Rhetoric of Victims, Offenders, and Risk 
While the theoretical models discussed above may partially explain underlying factors in 
the expansion of sex offender laws, it remains unclear how politicians negotiate understandings 
of victimization, offender dangerousness, and risk when designing and implementing sex 
offender policies. A few studies address this topic with conflicting results: Edwards and Hensley 
(2001) find that the emotional nature of victim advocacy creates pressure for politicians to 
conform with their demands, or risk being labeled too “sympathetic” towards sex offenders 
(Leon 2011). In contrast, Sample and Kadleck (2010) find that, while constituent pressure may 
  14 
play some role in influencing politicians, it is largely policy makers’ personal opinions that drive 
the content of sex offender legislation.  
Changing legislative processes may also shape the extent to which victim-based 
narratives and understandings of danger and risk are possible or resonant. While literature 
theorizes that emotional narratives can provoke political reactions (Irvine 2008, Herdt 2009), less 
work examines this relationship from the other direction—how changing political approaches 
and environments impact the types of narratives used to discuss sexual crime, or the ways in 
which those narratives may resonate differently in different political settings.  
Lynch (2002) is one of few scholars who analyzes the emotional rhetoric present in such 
discourses, pointing out that legislative discussions of risk are always “seeped in a constellation 
of emotional expressions of disgust, fear of contagion, and pollution avoidance.” She examines 
how such rhetoric functions within a legislative setting, but does not examine how that setting 
itself might impact these discussions. Narratives of risk management most frequently appear in 
more “objective” environments, such as legislatures and courts, while narratives of victimization 
and moral outrage appear both within legislation and via collective cultural narratives about 
sexual danger (Irvine 2008). Comparing changes to the SVP Act that occurred via divergent 
political approaches and settings allows me to examine whether such settings necessitate or rely 
on different discourses or ways of understanding the sexually predatory, and how understandings 
of risk may shift in varying political contexts.    
 
Propositions, Voting, and Emotions 
This is of particular importance lawmaking processes become more partisan (Dunlap, 
McCright, and Yarosh 2016) and as the use of ballot initiatives and popular democracy to make 
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state-level legislation increases (Sabato, Larson, and Ernst 2001). Between 1976 and 1996, 
Californians voted on 106 statewide ballot initiatives, compared to 29 from 1954 to 1974. In 
2018, sixteen initiatives were certified for the California ballot (California Ballot Propositions 
2018). California ballot initiatives are brought about by writing proposed laws as petitions, 
submitting them to the Attorney General, and obtaining the signatures of five percent of the 
number of people who voted in the most recent election for Governor (currently 623,212 
signatures) (Baldassare 2013). If the initiative receives the requisite signatures, it is placed 
directly on the electoral ballot for a vote.  
Initiatives can drastically impact the state budget. Unlike bills that move through the 
legislature, they do not have to go through the Appropriations Committee for financial approval, 
and essentially have free reign to cap or expand funding in any way they see fit (including 
amending tax codes) (Matsusaka 2005). While the Legislative Analyst’s Office and Department 
of Finance provide analysis of the bill’s potential impact on state and government finances, this 
assessment simply provides information—it does not impact the ability of an initiative to move 
forward in any way (State Assembly 2019). In California, this has resulted in reductions on state 
education spending, cuts in property taxes, and, in the case of Proposition 83, redirections of 
large amounts of money towards special programs and policies (Cummins 2018). 
As the use of initiatives grows, so too does their scope. One major change in this area is 
the increasing use of initiatives to legislate crime and criminal issues (Donovan and Karp 2006). 
Initiatives tend to represent more extreme political ideologies, emotions, and interests (for 
example, initiatives in California have included the death penalty, gay marriage, and legalizing 
marijuana) (Gamble 1997, Smith and Tolbert 2001, HoSang 2010). In addition, while often 
presented as “citizen led,” recent initiatives in California tend to be driven and funded by special 
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interest groups and political parties (Camp 2008, Smith and Tolbert 2001).  
Initiatives represent a unique opportunity for legislation to enter into the public arena and 
become subject to voter opinion. In the case of legislating sex crimes, this may have uniquely 
intense or punitive results. Sex crimes tend to elicit heightened emotions such as fear, anxiety, 
and distress (Rogers and Ferguson 2011). These types of emotions impact voter behavior and 
responsiveness (Halperin, Canetti, and Kimhi 2012, Panagopoulos 2010)—fear, for example, can 
motivate increased voter participation (Brader 2005). Irvine (2008) argues that sex panics rely on 
public dramatizations to deploy scripts and images that trigger fear. Ballot initiatives may 
represent an arena of public dramatization, a setting that allows for fear and demonization of sex 
offenders to become integrated into law in new and varied ways. Analyzing the political 
strategies and rhetoric used in Proposition 83 allows me to examine how popular democracy in 
particular may shape the way in which the sexually predatory is both understood and 
incorporated into law. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Case Study Selection 
In the following analysis, I compare the 1996 introduction and construction of the Sexual 
Violent Predator category in California to the changes made to the law in 2006 via Proposition 
83. Because Proposition 83 significantly altered California’s SVP Act, this is an ideal 
comparison. The original 1996 SVP Act, also known as California Welfare and Institutions Code 
(WIC) 6600, defined an SVP as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 
against two or more victims…and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a 
danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually 
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violent criminal behavior” (§ 6600. Definitions, CA WEL & INST § 6600). At the time the law 
was implemented, individuals received SVP designations for repeat offenses statutorily defined 
as involving force, violence, duress, menace or fear of injury (for example: rape, sodomy, oral 
copulation, or lewd and lascivious acts). “Predatory” was defined largely in relation to potential 
victims: either as a crime committed against a stranger/unknown victim, or by establishing a 
relationship with a victim for the purpose of victimization.  
 In 2006, Proposition 83 introduced a number of changes to California criminal law. It 
added indefinite GPS monitoring for felony sex offenders, expanded the list of crimes that 
qualified for life sentences in prison to include assault to commit rape during the commission of 
a first degree burglary, prohibited probation in lieu of prison for some sex offenses (including 
spousal rape and lewd or lascivious acts), eliminated early release credits for inmates with 
multiple convictions for specified felony sex offenses such as rape, extended parole for habitual 
sex offenders, and increased court-imposed fees charged to offenders required to register as sex 
offenders.  
In also made several changes to civil law by modifying the 1996 SVP Act. The most 
drastic of these changes were lowering the number of SVP qualifying offenses from two to one 
and changing civil commitment from a two-year term to an indeterminate one. It also redefined 
all sexual crimes against victims under the age of 14 as sexually violent offenses. The previous 
version of the law required offending acts that “involved substantial sexual conduct,” defining 
this conduct as penetration, oral copulation, or masturbation—the revised law removed these 
sections (Section 6600.1a, b). At the same time, Proposition 83 altered the law so that juvenile 
convictions would count towards SVP eligibility if the offender was age sixteen or older at the 
time of that conviction (Section 6600.1 g). In conjunction with each other, these changes vastly 
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expanded the number of juvenile offenders who could qualify for SVP classification. Figure 1 
summarizes the major changes the Proposition 83 made to the original SVP Act.  
 
Figure 1: Major changes to the 1996 SVP Act that occurred as the result of Proposition 83 
 
 
Data and Methodology 
 The following discussion is grounded in comparative analysis of legislative text and 
debates that occurred in California’s 1996 SVP Act and in California’s Proposition 83. I used the 
search engine Westlaw Next to examine the SVP Act’s introduction, review legislative analyses 
prepared by committee consultants and the staff of the Assembly Office of Research, and to look 
at the bill’s stated purpose, fiscal impact, and support/opposition (the name of the bill was 
“Assembly Bill 888”). I reviewed the nine California Assembly Reports available on the bill 
from its introduction on April 18, 1995 – October 10, 1995, when Governor Pete Wilson signed 
A.B. 888 into law (A.B. 888 was signed into law in 1995, and it went into effect on January 1, 
1996), noting major shifts, changes, and debates that occurred. I used the UC Hastings Law 
School Repository on California Ballot Propositions, which provides the full text of all 
1996 SVP Act SVP Act after Proposition 83
Two  qualifying offenses required for SVP 
determination
One  qualifying offense required for SVP 
determination
Two-year  civil commitment Indefinite civil commitment 
Offenses against victims under age 14 must 
involve "substantial sexual conduct ” in order to 
be considered sexually violent
All offenses  against children under age 14 
considered sexually violent offenses
Does not mention juvenile offenses
Counts juvenile offenses towards SVP 
determination if the offender was 16 years of age 
at the time of offense
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individual ballot propositions and related legal and legislative history in the state, to examine 
Proposition 83. This dataset includes information on who funds, sponsors, and supports the 
inclusion of Propositions on the ballot, and who opposes them. I used additional information 
from Ballotpedia, an online encyclopedia of American politics and elections that provides 
information about ballot initiatives, to analyze additional ballot documents and funding sources.  
I also occasionally drew from two expert interviews, each 90 minutes long, with key 
actors involved in the 1996 SVP Act and Proposition 83. I conducted the first in February of 
2017 with Judge James E. Rogan1, a former member of the California House of Representatives 
who introduced and drafted the original Sexual Predator Act. I conducted the second in May of 
2017 with George Runner2, the representative who introduced, funded, and sponsored 
Proposition 83. These interviews help elucidate how people participating in these legislative 
processes understand their motivations and political approaches, shedding light on some of the 
ways that they orient their actions within and in relation to larger institutional structures 
(Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). 
 
FINDINGS 
In the following section, I demonstrate how unique features of the ballot Proposition 
system allow for the incorporation of rhetoric that the legislative system does not, making 
legislative changes possible in 2006 that were not possible in 1996. Specifically, I find that 
lawmakers in 1996 worked within existing legislative constraints, relying on civil law and the 
 
1 Judge James E. Rogan (Superior Court of California), interview by Rebecca DiBennardo, February 1, 2017, 
transcript available upon request.  
 
2 George Runner (Board of Equalization, 1st District, California), interview by Rebecca DiBennardo, May 18, 2017, 
transcript available upon request. 
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rhetoric of risk management to gain support for and implement the original SVP Act. In contrast, 
legislators in 2006 used the ballot initiative system to circumvent traditional legislative processes 
and enact changes via popular vote that they had not been able to make a year earlier through the 
legislative process. I contend that part of the reason why the ballot system could produce these 
changes is that it created a space for a rhetoric of child victims, which may have helped to 
convince voters to approve a more punitive law. These results demonstrate how the use of 
popular democratic systems may be used to heighten public emotions in the service of creating 
or justifying more punitive laws. I discuss these findings in more detail below. 
 
Introducing the 1996 SVP Act: New Directions in Civil Law 
James R. Rogan introduced A.B. 888, the original SVP bill, to the California legislature 
on April 18, 1995. During the two-year timeframe surrounding this bill, the California legislature 
passed several extremely punitive criminal reform laws, all of which went through the 
legislature. These included a “one strike” law mandating 25-year sentences for specific sexual 
crimes, including rape, forcible spousal rape, and lewd conduct with a child under the age of 14 
(Cal. Penal Code§ 667.61 (1999)), a law requiring nonvoluntary chemical castration for certain 
child molesters (Cal. Penal Code§ 645 (2000)), and the now-notorious “Three Strikes Law,” 
which enhanced sentencing for those with violent felony convictions and mandated a state prison 
term of 25 years to life for those with two prior such convictions (Lynch 2002). 
The stated purpose of A.B. 888 was to deal with the limitations of determinate sentencing 
that “compel[ed] the release of about 250…predatory child molesters, forcible rapists, and repeat 
violent sex offenders…a month” (CA Legis. Assemb. AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996). The draft 
went on to point out that current law did not allow for the detention and treatment of sexually 
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violent offenders who, because of “mental abnormalities or personality disorders,” were likely to 
reoffend. As a solution, the bill proposed civil commitment of these offenders for two years (and 
no longer), followed by conditional release.  
 Rogan stated of his intentions regarding the bill: 
One thing I had come to learn during my time in the criminal justice field, is that of all the 
crimes, or criminals, if you will, the one area out there where the recidivism rate was the 
highest was for sex offenders. You know, for burglars and carjackers and so forth, at some 
point, if they don't spend the rest of their lives in jail, they realize that the cost of doing 
business is no longer a bargain for them, and so they move onto other things. But with sex 
crimes, I think the recidivist rate back then was around 70 or 80%. So I knew that going 
into the legislature…we [knew] the recidivist rates on these types of predators is very 
high…it was…for people that showed a pattern within their criminal history of sexual 
violence…rather than having life sentences up in state prison or whatever, civilly commit 
them like we do anybody else who can’t control their behavior and become a danger to 
themselves and to society…” (James E. Rogan, pers. comm.).  
In this statement, Rogan uses recidivism statistics (which are, in fact, highly variable and 
contested, despite frequent use as evidence in both sex offender court cases and legislation, see 
(Hanson and Bussiere 1998)) to justify two-year terms of civil commitment. This law, in contrast 
to other laws at the time that enhanced criminal sentencing, was designed to regulate behavior 
and prevent future harm. It would more on creating a new definition of sexually violent behavior 
and classifying offenders that fell into that category as a future risk to public safety. It would do 
so by arguing that various types of sexual behavior were pathological and constituted mental 
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disorders, therefore falling into the domain of civil law and facilitating mandatory commitment 
as a response.  
Enacting a law in the civil domain also offered a number of practical political advantages 
that creating a new criminal law or enhancing criminal sentencing would not. Most importantly, 
such a law could be applied retroactively—that is, to offenders already convicted of sex crimes 
(criminal laws can only be applied moving forward). Second, despite general support for 
enhanced criminal sentencing during this time, the legislative make-up of the Assembly and 
State Senate leaned democratic (Ballotpedia 2019), and, according to Rogan, was “more 
sensitive to the arguments of groups like the ACLU” (James E. Rogan, per. comm.). Working 
within civil law was thus perceived as politically easier, as it was justified by mental health 
arguments, rather than overtly punitive intentions. The processes of civil law in this case 
integrally relate to the rhetoric legislators would go on to employ. In subsequent debates, 
narratives of risk assessment, reoffence, and dangerousness worked in tandem with mental health 
diagnoses to create and define the Sexual Predator. 
Civil commitment was not, at this point in time, a new way of treating sex offenders in 
the state of California. In 1939, the state implemented a series of civil laws called the Sexual 
Psychopath Laws that allowed the commitment of those found guilty of specific sexual crimes 
(in particular sexual offenses against children and/or acts of sodomy) to mental hospitals 
(Jenkins 2004). These laws were eventually renamed the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender 
(MSDO) Laws. They continued until 1982, when, upon the recommendation of the American 
Bar Association’s Committee on Criminal Justice Health Standards and the President’s 
Commission on Mental Health, the state repealed them, citing concerns about a lack of medical 
diagnostic criteria under which to commit people, as well as the efficacy of existing treatment 
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programs (Association 1999). In addition, the state determined that the legal implementation of 
MDSO laws was both a form of preventative detention and extremely discretionary, therefore 
violating the doctrine of substantive due process (Birgden and Cucolo 2011).  
The version of A.B.888 introduced by Rogan was almost identical to MDSO Laws, but 
contained one major difference—while MDSO laws diverted offenders to mental hospitals in 
lieu of criminal prosecution, the new law proposed to act in addition to criminal sentencing—
taking effect at the end of offenders’ prison terms. The new law would use dangerousness, rather 
than “amenability to treatment,” as the criteria for commitment, thus speaking to potential due 
process issues (because the bill was about “protecting society from dangerous individuals”). 
Unlike MDSO Laws, it also gave potential SVPs the right to trials, counsel, cross examination, 
access to records, and to yearly reviews, appearing more fair and balanced than MDSO Laws 
(CA Legis. Assemb. AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996, 4/18/95).   
 
Legislative Processes, Debate, and Rhetoric 
Because A.B. 888 went through the state legislative process, it was subject to debates, 
revisions, and questions via feedback on the initial draft of the bill. These legislative processes of 
debate focused less on whether sexual offenders could be sorted based on risk or actuarial 
processes, or whether that is appropriate, and almost exclusively on how to go about sorting 
offenders already determined to be dangerous for one reason or another. On July 11, for 
example, the legislature responded to version one of A.B. 888 with a number of follow-up 
questions, the majority asking for clarification about “treatment” in the law’s context. One major 
question was whether those who might be categorized as SVPs in the future should be notified at 
the time of their conviction and treated from the beginning of their incarceration (CA Legis. 
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Assemb. AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996, 7/11/95). Another asked that, if provisions in the bill 
were penal, rather than treatment-oriented, should the bill be applied prospectively (that is, to 
offenders convicted of such crimes after the bill passed, rather than to offenders already serving 
time for such offenses)? 
The written response from the bill sponsors to these questions described the proposed 
evaluation process for SVP determination, although it did not identify the time at which such 
offenders would be categorized as SVPs (the language simply states, “once identified…”). It 
went on to describe the processual timeline of court review, a commitment hearing, and the legal 
right to representation and trial by jury of the potential SVP, implying that both evaluation and a 
hearing would occur at the end of a criminal sentence (although never directly stating that). In 
addition, while inmates would be told that the purpose of evaluations was to determine if they 
met the criteria to be involuntarily committed, “It would not be required that [they] appreciate or 
understand that information” (CA Legis. Assemb. AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996, 7/11/1995).  
The response did not speak to the question of treatment during criminal imprisonment, 
but specified that treatment would occur only via the State Department of Mental Health (i.e. in a 
State Hospital, i.e. after the criminal sentence was over). It went on to point out that, although the 
hospital would “afford” treatment, “…amenability to treatment is not required for a finding that 
any person is a Sexually Violent Predator, nor is it required for treatment of that person: 
“Treatment does not mean that the treatment be successful or potentially successful, nor does it 
mean that the person must recognize his or her problem and willingly participate in the treatment 
program” (AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996, 7/11/95).  
In a bill analysis document (a summary of the bill written in laymen’s terms), the 
California Psychiatric Association noted concerns with A.B. 888 regarding distinctions between 
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personality disorders and mental disorders, highlighting that the bill essentially used the two 
interchangeably, but that only a mental disorder would justify commitment. In addition, it stated 
that treatment had to be available that would lead to a reduction of a person’s dangerousness to 
justify commitment: “Psychiatry must always guard against psychiatric commitment being used 
as a method of social control devoid of treatment” (California Bill Analysis, A.B. 888 Sen., 
7/11/1995). Responding to these concerns, the authors modified A.B. 888, stating that, “a small 
but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental 
disorders…are not safe to be at large and if released represent a danger to the health and safety of 
others.” They went on to clarify that it was in the interest of society to confine and treat such 
individuals as long as their disorders persisted and they no longer presented a threat, but “not for 
any punitive purposes” (CA Legis. Assemb. AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996, 9/12/1995).  
During this time, the Department of Mental Health (DOH) was asked to provide a fiscal 
estimate of the bill, but did not do so before the bill reached the voting stage. Because they did 
not have an official estimate of cost, Rogan and his staff prepared a statement of projected costs 
based on 10% of current sex offenders falling into the SVP category (a relatively large 
percentage), which they estimated would not exceed 100 million dollars. The bill was 
subsequently placed in the Senate Appropriations Suspense file, where bills that will cost 
approximately $150,000 or more to taxpayers are usually sent (Myers 2016).  
On September 11, 1995, the Appropriations Committee voted unanimously to approve 
A.B. 888, although the DOH never provided an official cost estimate, and the committee noted 
that cost estimates were “by no means conclusive” and that the bill was similar to a Washington 
State law recently ruled to be unconstitutional (Legis. Assemb. AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996, 
9/11/1995). That the goal of the Appropriations Committee is “sound, responsible, affordable 
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fiscal policy” and the bill went through without a final estimate may speak to the political will 
and urgency for this law that was already present in 1996 (State Assembly 2019). But, as we will 
see in the next section, there were even fewer constraints in 2006, as the new law avoided the 
Appropriations process entirely. 
The next day, the legislature voted on the final version of A.B. 888. It received support 
from the Governor, the Attorney General, Women Prosecutors of California, the Committee On 
Moral Concerns California, a number of Sheriffs’ and Correctional Associations, and several 
victims’ rights organizations, including Justice for Murder Victims and Memory of Victims 
Everywhere. The California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., and 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) opposed the bill.  
The statement in favor of A.B. 888 was brief, pointing out that California needed a civil 
commitment procedure to give the state legal authority to “…detain and treat sexually violent 
offenders who, because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, [were] likely to re-
offend once released from prison,” and that “…Likewise, there [was] no current way to prevent 
their release into society” (CA Legis. Assemb. AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996, 9/12/1995). The 
statement in opposition to the bill, made by the ACLU, stated: 
This wide sweeping legislation permits the state to indefinitely confine in mental 
facilities individuals who have committed sexually motivated crimes based on perceived 
fears that these persons will commit future crimes. A.B. 888 is essentially a preventive 
detention scheme based on allegations of future dangerousness, and as such violates 
substantive due process of law…(CA Legis. Assemb. AB 888 Reg. Sess. 1995-1996, 
9/12/1995). 
A total of ten representatives voted against the bill as it passed in the Assembly (67 voted in 
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favor), all of whom declined to speak against it. Rogan pointed out issues with speaking out 
against sex offender laws in the Assembly, stating, “nobody wants to get hit back home with, 
‘You voted against increasing the penalty on child molesters’…that’s one of the more 
unfortunate aspects of the intersection between policy and politics (James E. Rogan, per. 
comm.). This indicates that legislators were likely aware of the pressure of popular sentiment, 
and demonstrates one way in which this sentiment may have entered into decision-making 
regarding the 1996 SVP Act. 
 Governor Pete Wilson opted to sign A.B. 888 into law on October 10 in front of a public 
audience that consisted of 800 local school children dressed in matching red tee-shirts (Figure 2). 
Judge James E. Rogan (pictured to the left of Governor Pete Wilson, who is signing the bill), 
said of the ceremony, “Usually, I’m not moved by the passage of bills. But as I looked out into 
that audience of children, I thought to myself, ‘A few of these children will not be victims 
because of this bill,’ and it brought a tear to my eye” (James E. Rogan, per. comm.). Despite this 
statement, child victims came up neither during substantive bill debates nor in the original bill’s 
text—it was when the bill left the legislature and became public that the discussion shifted 
toward child victims. 
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Figure 2: James E. Rogan and Governor Pete Wilson on October 10, 1995, signing A.B. 
888, the Sexually Violent Predator Statute 
 
 
  
 Overall, legislative structures appear to impact the type of rhetoric utilized in the initial 
SVP Act by pressuring politicians to disguise, minimize, or medically justify more emotional 
ideas about sexual predators and sex offenders generally. Yet the mechanisms of the legislative 
process that are supposed to constrain laws—bill drafts, discussion, funding and budget 
evaluations—appear to function more as formalities, demonstrating strong political will to pass 
the law at this point in time. My next section demonstrates that by 2005, the political context 
shifted slightly and these mechanisms mattered more. With decreased political will to pass 
modifications to the 1996 SVP Act and other sex offender laws through the legislature, 
proponents of changing the law turn to the ballot process to overcome these constraints.  
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Introducing Proposition 83: Circumventing the Legislature 
 In contrast to the legislative debates surrounding A.B. 888, Proposition 83 was an 
initiated state statute, which received 373,816 signatures to make it directly to the California 
ballot without input from the legislature in November of 2006. The initiative was a reaction to 
the “failure” of the legislature to pass a similar bill, the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control 
Act, in 2005 (Peckenpaugh 2006).  
 George Runner and his wife, Sharon (a State Assemblywoman), introduced the 2005 bill, 
and threatened the legislature that they would initiate a petition drive if the Sexual Predator 
Punishment and Control Act did not pass. This was a strategy that George Runner planned from 
the start, due to what he perceived as the legislature’s general unwillingness “move forward” on 
a number of bills regarding crime, a backlash from the rash of criminal sentencing enhancements 
that occurred in the 1990’s and because of a firm Democratic majority in the Assembly 
(Ballotpedia 2019). He stated: 
The legislature was just not wanting to add additional felonies, [which was] very 
frustrating to people who were concerned about, you know, potential issues with kids… As 
a result of that, the effort was then to go directly to the people with regards to the issues—
with regards to protecting children from predators…[So we decided to] introduce the 
whole bill, let the legislature take a look at it, and move forward with the initiative if the 
legislature did not (George Runner, per. comm.).  
Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Governor at the time, supported the Runners’ bill, and took a 
number of steps to ensure that more moderate sex offender legislation did not replace or 
supplement it. This included vetoing one bill in October of 2005 that proposed creating a Sex 
Offender Management Board to coordinate policy and another that implemented some residency 
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restrictions, arguing that neither bill was as broad in scope as the Sexual Predator Punishment 
and Control Act (Peckenpaugh 2006). 
Despite this support, when the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act went up for a 
vote on January 10, 2006, it failed to pass the Public Safety Committees of either the Assembly 
or the Senate. Amongst other objections, Democrats expressed concerns about its potential costs, 
the severe residency restrictions the bill proposed, and invasive nature of widespread electric 
monitoring it would implement. Parts of the bill that changed the SVP Act by eliminating time 
limitations on civil commitment bought up Constitutional concerns, as did the new residency 
restrictions it introduced. Democrats in the Assembly and Senate countered with two different 
pieces of sex offender legislation to address these concerns, AB 50 and SB 1128. These bills 
included some aspects of the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act, but left out some of 
its more contested elements, such as residency restrictions and GPS monitoring (Peckenpaugh 
2006). Yet, rather than modify their bill or respond to these alternatives, the Runners went forth 
with moving the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act to the initiative process.  
By the time the Act failed, the Runners had already set up the “Campaign for Child Safety, 
Jessica’s Law 2006,” (“Yes on 83”) the organization through which the voter-enacted 
proposition ultimately received over 75% of its donations and funding (Secretary of State 
2019b). They paid Bader and Associates, a petition management company that collects 
signatures to qualify ballot initiatives, $700,000 to collect the signatures for Proposition 83, 
which the Act came to be called. Bader and Associates has collected signatures for a number of 
Initiatives throughout the years, including Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in 
California in 2008, Proposition 4, which attempted to implement abortion waiting periods and 
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parental notification periods in 2008, and the 2003 Referendum on California Senate Bill 60, the 
vote to recall Gray Davis.  
  “Yes on 83” and “Southern Californians for Jessica's Law,” the second organization 
formed to fund the proposition, collected a total of $2,196,152 to fund the campaign in favor of 
the Proposition. These donations came from a variety of groups and individuals, including: 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s California Recovery Team, an organization formed to support 
Propositions Schwarzenegger was in favor of; the Nicholas Family Trust, a private trust that 
gives money primarily for children’s social services; and Jeff Denham for State Senate, a 
Republican Senator who received several awards from the California State Sheriffs’ Association 
and other law enforcement groups (Jessica’s Law, 2006). Further cementing his support, 
Governor Schwarzenegger endorsed Proposition 83, which George and Sharon Runner officially 
sponsored. Schwarzenegger, San Diego County District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis, and Harriet 
Salarno, President of Crime Victims United of California all supported the official “yes” vote 
position on the ballot. “Citizens for Responsible Elections,” the group opposing Proposition 83,  
collected $30,000 in donations (Jessica’s Law, 2006).  
 
The Proposition System and Child Victim Rhetoric 
Unlike A.B. 888, Proposition 83 consisted of both legal text as well as statements in favor 
and against the bill from opponents and proponents. Its actual substantive legal text focused 
heavily on child victims. In addition to mentioning children a total of 109 times, the bill initiative 
reduced the age difference between offenders and victims (from ten years to seven years) that 
qualified as aggravated sexual assault of a child, prohibited registered sex offenders from living 
within 2,000 feet of any school or park, made possession of child pornography a felony, and 
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expanded the definition of violent crime to encompass continuous child sexual abuse, amongst 
others.  
 Yet due to its location within the Proposition system, this legal text could be supplemented 
with additional literature and information distributed widely to the public and used on the ballot 
itself. Much of this literature focused on “protecting” the community by heavily emphasizing 
victims and community safety. In the hierarchy of constituent issues, according to Runner, public 
safety was at the top: “there’s nothing more basic than keeping people safe…And there’s nothing 
more basic than keeping children safe…” (George Runner, per. comm.). The ballot statement in 
favor of Proposition 83 utilized rhetoric of danger, protection and child victimization, stating: 
Our families deserve the protection of a tough sex offender punishment and control 
law…WE CANNOT WAIT ANOTHER DAY TO PROTECT OUR KIDS. Proposition 
83…will protect our children by keeping child molesters in prison longer; keeping them 
away from schools and parks; and monitoring their movements after they are released. A 
rape or sexual assault occurs every two minutes. A child is abused or neglected every 35 
seconds. Over 85,000 registered sex offenders live in California. Current law does not 
provide Law Enforcement with the tools they need to keep track of these dangerous 
criminals. Secrecy is the child molester’s biggest tool. How can we protect our children if 
we don’t even know where the sex offenders are? (California Proposition 83 2006) 
Thus, while Proposition 83 legally applied to a wide range of victims, (and offenders) the 
statement in favor almost exclusively discusses child victims. This statement is intended to 
induce fear, describing the myriad dangers that sex offenders post to public (and child) safety. 
The ballot also used statistics to emphasize sexual violence against children. For 
example, one section states, “More than two-thirds of the victims of rape and sexual assault are 
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under 18 years of age,” while another discusses the dangers of child pornography: “Child 
pornography exploits children and robs them of their innocence…Statistics show that 90% of the 
predators who molest children have had some type of involvement with pornography. Predators 
often use child pornography to aid in their molestation” (CA Proposition 83). It also mentioned 
the dangers of the Internet, pointing out that predators use it to lure children, and that heavier 
penalties for such acts were necessary “to reflect society’s disapproval” of such activities. Using 
these statistics, proponents of Proposition 83 were able to drum up fears about child safety.  
While Proposition 83 proposed several crucial reforms to the SVP Act, public materials 
about the bill did not explain the category of crimes that qualified individuals for sexual predator 
designation, define sexually violent offenses, or explain what was meant by a “diagnosed mental 
disorder.” The rebuttal to Proposition 83, written by Carleen R. Arlidge, at the time the President 
of the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, discussed existing SVP laws, but used them to 
point out why Proposition 83 was unnecessary. It stated that California already had laws that 
protected the public from “child molesters” and “dangerous sex offenders,” and that the Initiative 
applied far beyond such persons (California Proposition 83 2006). This opposing statement both 
employed the rhetoric of child victims and simultaneously reinforced associations between the 
sexually predatory, danger, and sexual offenses against children. 
In conjunction with information presented on the ballot, “Yes on 83” conducted an 
extensive public relations campaign wherein they used donations to distribute materials 
encouraging voters to vote in favor of the Proposition. The “Yes on 83” website consolidated 
news articles and press coverage discussing the initiative favorably, consolidated and highlighted 
key provisions of the bill, advertised volunteer opportunities, and posted photos of politicians 
(including Schwarzenegger) who supported it (Yes on 83 2006).   
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 Despite fiscal concerns about the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act expressed 
by the legislature, Proposition 83 went though the initiative process with an identical budget, 
estimating net costs at “several tens of millions of dollars initially, growing to a couple hundred 
million dollars annually within ten years” (California Proposition 83, 2006). The statement in 
favor argued that these costs would be partially offset by court and parolee fees authorized by the 
measure (though that would be contingent on offenders’ ability to pay). It also speculated that 
GPS would be a “deterrent” to committing new crimes, which would save the state money, 
particularly because offenders would also have to pay for their own GPS monitoring. The 
rebuttal to Proposition 83 pointed out that taxpayers would pay upwards of 500 million dollars 
for measures that would not really increase safety.  
 Ultimately, Proposition 83 passed with 70.5% overall voter support, and in 57 out of 58 
California counties. Of the 132 approved ballot measures between 1912 and 2016, only 17 
passed with 70% support or higher.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
These findings demonstrate how the Proposition system allows for the incorporation of 
rhetoric in California’s SVP Act that the legislative system does not, justifying different legal 
penalties for sexual predators at each point in time. While lawmakers in 1996 relied on civil law 
and the rhetoric of risk management to gain support for and implement the original SVP Act, 
legislators in 2006 used the ballot initiative system to circumvent traditional legislative 
processes. By opting to enact changes via popular vote, they were able to incorporate and 
capitalize upon voter fears, using the rhetoric of child victims to convince voters to approve a 
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more punitive law. These results demonstrate how the use of popular democratic systems may be 
used to heighten public emotions in the service of creating more punitive laws.  
My findings show how politicians and legislators can take advantage of cultural anxiety 
about sex crime to pursue their own political agendas. In contrast to past work suggesting that 
moral panic narratives usually emerge from the public and gain legislative support (Herdt 2009), 
I demonstrate that such panics may also emerge from legislatures and legislative bodies. 
Changing political environments, then, play an integral role in how such narratives become 
integrated into law, impacting both the type and degree of emotion legislators are able or choose 
to employ. 
As both a legal document and a public spectacle, the initiative process facilitates—in fact 
encourages—the integration of emotional rhetoric, relying on public dramatizations that provoke 
fear and anxiety (Irvine 2008). Ballot information focuses almost exclusively on child victims, 
both exaggerating the sexual violence they face and emphasizing that violence against children is 
everywhere (the internet, schools and parks, etc.). In contrast, the 1996 SVP Act rarely discusses 
child victims or victimization. Child victim rhetoric enters into discussions only when the bill 
moves to the public domain and is signed into law—the first time legislative discussions become 
overtly emotion-based.  
Irvine (2008) found that such dramatizations occurred in “arenas of discursive action” 
such as school board meetings, legislative hearings, and town-hall events—“the hypothetical 
public sphere of rational discourse.” My results extend these findings, demonstrating that the 
ballot initiative system may constitute a new and wider arena for such discourse, providing a vast 
public forum for a rhetoric of “contamination” (Lynch 2002: 539). Historically, such rhetoric has 
led to extreme policies and measures, ranging from laws banning male homosexuality to anti-
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immigrant national barriers to Nazi anti-Semitism and the extermination of Jews in Europe. 
Thus, the emotions that sex crimes tend to bring about, combined with the lack of traditional 
legislative checks and balances in this particular political environment, could lead to ever-more 
punitive policies, and to a more dramatic degree. 
That the initiative process is termed “citizen led,” while citizens play little role in 
designing initiatives (Camp 2008) also allows political actors to effectively absolve themselves 
of blame for such policies. In the case of Proposition 83, citizens did not actually design or give 
feedback on the bill, yet were encouraged to distribute materials, advocate for the bill, support it, 
and, of course, vote for it. Yet the authors of the bill justified its need using rhetoric about public 
demand and constituent frustration with existing laws. This demonstrates one way in which 
politicians may manipulate the idea of popular sentiment to claim that policies are what the 
public wants, when in fact they are simply policies that were too polarizing to pass through the 
legislature. This also suggests that the narratives politicians create about moral panics (the 
hypothetical concepts and constituents to which they attempt to appeal) may influence policy as 
much or more as those panics themselves (Barker 2007, Cohen 2011, Small 2015).  
These findings have important social, legal, and political implications, in large part 
because the use of the Proposition system to modify criminal law in California continues to 
grow. In the past five years, California Propositions have attempted to change felony and 
misdemeanor sentencing, soften regulations applying to juvenile offenders, and overturn the 
death penalty (Secretary of State 2019a). Propositions have also begun to directly target sexual 
crimes and offenders, either by exempting sex crimes from criminal reform (for example, 
Proposition 47 reformed punitive drug sentencing laws, but not for registered sex offenders), or, 
as in the case of Proposition 83, directly changing sex offender laws and policies.  
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It is important to note that these results apply to California and California’s SVP Act 
specifically. However, as California often leads the way in legal policy for the United States, 
these results may provide a starting point for researchers to further examine national shifts 
towards popular democratic systems, particularly their role in regulating crime. Another potential 
area of future work that warrants attention is the continued elevation of some child victims over 
others (identifying citations). In the case of Proposition 83, we see this in the way the law both 
calls for child protection and expands categories of juvenile crime to make young offenders 
eligible for indefinite confinement. This finding adds to contemporary scholarship indicating that 
child sex offenders tend to be treated similarly to adult offenders, with little distinction in the 
approach to punishment or treatment (Chaffin 2008), and demonstrates where the limitations to 
the emotional appeal of children may lie. 
Overall, this study demonstrates how the Proposition system allows for the incorporation 
of rhetoric in California’s SVP Act that the legislative system does not, justifying different legal 
penalties for sexual predators at different points in time. Legislatures and legislative policy are 
certainly flawed, but, when they enact punitive polices, they do so within institutional norms and 
constraints that popular democratic systems do not face. As the United States becomes more 
politically divided, we must examine how these systems facilitate the incorporation of 
heightened public emotions into law and policy, and the implications that incorporation may 
have for legislating crime. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Ideal Victims and Monstrous Offenders: How the News Media Represent Sexual Predators 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Drawing on content analysis of 323 Los Angeles Times articles published between 1990 and 
2015 that include the term “sexual predator,” this study systematically investigates how news 
reports represent sexual predator victims, crimes, and offenders, constructing specific images of 
the sexual predatory in the process. Results demonstrate that representations of the sexually 
predatory are aged and gendered: stories about child victims encompass more sexual violence, 
graphic descriptions of that violence, more male victims, and older offenders. Articles use child 
victims as a rhetorical tool to emphasize the “predatory” nature of offenders and justify 
retributory violence or harsh legal punishment against sexual predators. Narratives about adult 
victims focus mainly on women, framing them as responsible for their victimization and 
minimizing their importance relative to child victims. The cumulative effect of this coverage 
narrows representations of victims and violence, contributing key dynamics to both the social 
and legal predator template.  
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INTRODUCTION 
While several recent, high-profile sexual assault and harassment cases have sparked an 
ongoing national dialogue about “sexual predators,” the rise of predator discourse predates the 
series of events leading up to the #MeToo movement last year. In fact, over the past 15 years, the 
predator discourse has become central to how people conceptualize and discuss sexual violence, 
both constitutive of and reflective of expanding and increasingly punitive sex offender laws in 
the United States (Meiners 2009) Janus (2006) points out that, “There is increasingly myopic 
focus on the ‘predator’ as personifying the danger to [communities]…the predator template [has 
become] more and more central to how we think and talk about sexual violence” (131). But how 
do various institutions (legal, cultural, and otherwise) lend meaning to this term?  
Legally, California’s 1996 “Sexually Violent Predator Act” categorizes and defines 
“sexual predators” as pathological, repeat, and violent offenders. Legal descriptions of criminal 
sexual acts provide a framework for the public to interpret deviant sexuality—the language they 
use is imbued with meaning (Jenkins 2004). The use of the term “sexual predator” sets up a 
polarizing and extreme image from the very beginning, “…convey[ing] a medieval image that 
has never entirely been eliminated from Western images of the frightening, the disgusting, the 
horrible, the dangerous, and the unbearably, and erotically, fascinating” (Douard 2008).  
Yet, through colloquial use, legal terms also come to take on additional social and 
cultural meaning, particularly in the case of sex crimes and sexual offenders. The term “pervert,” 
for example, first a legal category, now brings to mind any number of seemingly depraved 
sexualities. Similarly, the term “pedophile” has become “our most frequented cultural and 
linguistic toilet,” used to symbolize a variety of revulsions (Kincaid 1998). While legal language 
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thus sets the stage for exaggerated interpretations of sexual predators (Janus 2006), other cultural 
arenas likely reflect and shape how this term comes to be understood.  
News media represent one such arena. As a domain through which meanings of crime 
and deviance are “constructed, attributed, and enforced” (Ferrell and Websdale 1999), the way 
the news media use the term sexual predator (both the stories they select and the language used 
within those stories) construct part of its socially structured meaning (Hartley 2013). Yet, while 
research documents news media emphasis on “sensational” sex crimes (Kitzinger 2004, Greer 
2012) and the legislative and political results of the “panic” this can create (Lancaster 2011, 
Leon 2011, Krinsky 2016), studies have yet to examine how media representations of sex crimes 
can lend symbolic meaning to sexual violence itself.  
In contrast, this study systematically investigates how news reports represent sexual 
predator victims, crimes, and offenders, constructing specific images of the sexual predatory in 
the process. Drawing on content analysis of 323 Los Angeles Times articles published between 
1990 and 2015 that use the term “sexual predator” anywhere in their text, I demonstrate that aged 
and gendered narratives contribute key dynamics to the sexual predator template. Stories about 
the youngest victims encompass more sexual violence, graphic descriptions of that violence, 
more male victims, and the oldest offenders. News media use these same child narratives as a 
rhetorical tool to emphasize the “predatory” nature of offenders and justify retributory violence 
or harsh legal punishment. In contrast, narratives about adult victims (which often originate from 
legal and police discourse) focus mainly on women, often framing them as responsible for their 
victimization, and effectively removing them from predator discourse.  
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LITERATURE 
Sex Offender Laws, Symbolic Meaning, and Media 
“Inappropriate” sexual desire has long been a societal “vector of oppression,” marking 
the deviant and different (Nardi and Schneider 2013). Yet, what defines sexual deviance and 
perversion, the way in which sexual “deviants” or “perverts” have been legally controlled, and 
what constitutes various sexual identities varies across history (Chauncey 1994, D'emilio 2014). 
California’s Sexually Violent Predator law reflects general trends in increasing sex offender 
regulation in the United States over the past 25 years, which include augmented mandatory 
minimum sentencing, expanded probation requirements (including GPS monitoring, polygraph 
tests, and internet use bans), and required public registration in all 50 states for convicted adult 
sex offenders (37 states require juvenile sex offender registration) (Jenkins 2004, Meiners 2009). 
 “Moral panic” theories posit that media amplification of fear and deviance has led to these 
reactionary and extreme political and legal responses (Ferree, Gamson et al. 2002, Jenkins 2004). 
More contemporary understandings of moral panic point out the increasingly blurred divide 
between media and society, particularly with the advent of social media. Such understandings 
point out that it may be more useful to think of the ways in which the media socially organizes 
problems, rather than how it distributes or amplifies them (Fischel 2016). 
 Sexually Violent Predator Laws highlight the complicated relationship of timing and 
directionality between media and law. Use of the term “sexual predator” in media discourse grew 
the most after the implementation of Sexually Violent Predator laws. Between 1950 and 1992, 
the term’s non-legal use was rare (practically nonexistent). However, newspaper articles, 
television shows, internet watchdog/advocacy forums, and political candidates now frequently 
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mention sexual predators (Filler 2002).3  
Fischel (2016) points out that, in prevailing theories of media influence and moral panic 
(Cohen 2011), the law acts as the endpoint—it is the ultimate formalization of social outrage. 
But, Fischel (2016) points out, this view does not allow for the notion that the law may also 
shape “prevailing mythologies, stigmas, and stereotypes” (2016). Specifically, the law itself can 
frame and identify sexual harm:  
The presence of the law makes the problem of sexual violence one of criminal justice, 
rather than, say, public health, social structures, inequality, or gender enculturation. 
Violence is individuated, pathological, and most importantly, punitively fixable through 
the juridical arm of the state, and by extension, the juridical view of the [public] (37).  
The law has the potential to thus be productive, rather than simply reactive.  
Yet the news media also influence how the law operates across bodies by shaping popular 
understandings of victims and offenders; the way in which news media construct and reconstruct 
the criminal as social and political concerns to the public attribute symbolic meanings to crime 
(Ferrell and Websdale 1999, Fischel 2016). This process both generates its own images and 
“images of images,” as media incorporate and reproduce narratives filtered through police, legal 
representatives, politicians, and others (Ferrell and Websdale 1999). Because the public is 
largely distant from crime and criminal subcultures, these subcultures can come to be defined by 
media coverage—particularly in the case of sexual predators, as Sexually Violent Predator laws 
remain obscure to the general public (Ferrell, Milovanovic et al. 2001, Cohen and Jeglic 2007). 
In contrast to a moral panic understanding of media’s role, this process is constant and evolving. 
 
3 My own data analysis of the Los Angeles Times indicates that, of the 324 articles that used the term “sexual predator” within the 
sample period (1985-2015), zero articles appeared that used the term between 1985 and 1990. From 1990-1995, that number rose 
to 27, then 123 between 1996 and 2000 (the peak amount over any five-year period of the sample), then 102 between 2000 and 
2005, and, finally, to 72 for the remainder of the sample time period. 
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Thus, how media construct understandings of crimes, victims, and offenders in the context of the 
“sexual predatory” can tell us how this term takes on symbolic meaning, and in more nuanced 
ways. 
Media, Sex Crime Victims, and “Entertainment” 
 Yet, while the news media present crime and crime control as social and political 
concerns, they also present them as entertainment (Fishman and Cavender 1998). Sex crimes in 
particular receive vast amounts of “lowest common denominator” journalism coverage, which 
highlights violent, “depraved” sexual conduct (Kitzinger 2004, Jewkes 2015). The further a 
crime departs from cultural norms, the more newsworthy or intrinsically entertaining media tend 
to consider it (Pritchard and Hughes 1997, Bok 1998). Jewkes (2005) calls this “oversaturation 
of the extraordinary”—extremely rare crimes, such as random stranger and sexual violence, and 
victims perceived as more vulnerable (women, children, etc.), receive disproportionate attention 
(Naylor 2001, Lynch 2002, Wilson and Silverman 2002, Quinn, Forsyth et al. 2004). Within 
such stories, media focus on the most “extreme” cases—serial rape, extremely old victims 
(Meyers 1996), multiple child victims (Chermak 1998), and the abduction of children by 
strangers (Wilczynski and Sinclair 2016). 
Such reporting evocatively and graphically describes violence and victims (Ferrell and 
Websdale 1999). For example, discussions of child victims tend to equate violence with sexual 
violence, even if evidence of the latter does not exist (Levine 2006). News media prioritize 
stories of child victims over those of adult victims (Jenkins 2004), presenting them as blameless, 
asexual, and androgynous (Kincaid 1998) (Krinsky 2016). In contrast, adult victims are primarily 
women, and held accountable for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, “questionable” 
sexual histories, or poor judgement (Meyers 1996). Failing to perform hegemonic femininity—
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by being “oversexualized,” working outside of the home, having same-sex relationships (Collins 
2004)—exacerbates the likelihood of this framing (Greer 2007, Jewkes 2015). 
Classic literature on victimization points out that the term “victim” is not objective, and 
that both individual as well as social-level understandings of crime impact how victims are 
perceived. The public tend to give certain “ideal victims”—those that possess various socially 
desirable characteristics—more legitimate victim status (Christie 1986). Best (1997) argues that 
ideas about “ideal” victims transform such victims into symbolic figures that help explain 
various social ills and problems, impacting societal perceptions of intimate violence and 
individual responsibility (Dunn 2010). 
Perceptions of victim agency impact the degree to which they evoke sympathy or are 
considered ideal. “Pure” victims without agency are portrayed as blameless, but victims 
perceived as “impure” can be judged for this same lack of agency. In contrast, victims portrayed 
as having agency (often called “survivors”) tend to evoke public admiration and appeal to 
broader audiences. The degree to which victims meet these expectations impacts the extent to 
which they are able to establish or access victim identity (Dunn 2004, Dunn 2008). Lu (Cho, Gee 
et al. 2016) adds that race further impacts understandings of victim blameworthiness. For 
example news media depictions of Asian Americans as “model minorities” allows them to access 
“legitimate” victim status by transforming their experiences into community trauma and shared 
loss. In contrast, victims of color who do not fit into this model remain “outsiders,” preventing 
access to status as ideal victims. 
Yet such analyses of media victim coverage and understandings of victims tend to be 
partial, focusing on one type of victim only (for example, adult victims only, adult women only, 
children only, or high-profile cases) (Christie 1986, Meyers 1996, Levine 2006, Dunn 2008, 
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Cheit 2014). Greer (2012) notes that existing scholarly work in this area thus tends to make 
general conclusions based on pieces of data, rather than a complete picture. In addition, this type 
of partial inquiry does not fully account for the impact of age and gender differences in victim 
representation. Meyers’ (1996) research on media coverage of violent crime against women 
notes that framing in this instance reinforces stereotypes that blame women for the violence 
enacted against them, but does not look at media coverage of men or of child victims. Anastasio 
and Costa (2004) analyze media treatment of both men and women who are sex crime victims 
and find that men are more personalized in media coverage, and that this personalization is 
associated with increased empathy, but do not include child victims in their analysis. 
Correspondingly, research on media coverage of child sex crimes finds that violent coverage of 
extreme crimes distracts from more prevalent sources of harm to children and reduces child 
sexual autonomy, but lumps all child victims together by gender and does not look at how this 
coverage compares to that of adult victims (Kincaid 1998, Kitzinger 2004), or the way that 
increasingly child-centric narratives may impact news media focus on adult victims.  
But Fischel (2016) points out that “sex across age means different things for differently 
gendered and sexual subjects,” pointing out that, in order to understand differences in how 
people construct meaning regarding what constitutes violence and consent, research must take 
into account the age, gender, and sexuality of both victims and offenders (50). Thus, examining 
the intersecting role of victim age and gender in sexual predator narratives can contribute 
important information regarding how victim hierarchies are created and reproduced, why some 
victims are valued over others, and how those hierarchies may reflect and feed back into law and 
understandings of “ideal” victims. 
 
  
 
52 
Media and “Monster” Offenders 
Such narratives can also contribute information about how the public comes to view 
certain categories of sex offenders. Much news media research focuses on victim framing only, 
without examining how it may shape representations of offenders (Meyers 1996, Kitzinger 
2004). When news media does discuss sex offenders, it tends to conflate violence and pedophilia 
(Levine 2006, Lancaster 2011), and perpetuate the “bogeyman fallacy” that those who commit 
sex crimes have unique, unknown, and monstrous identities (Leon 2011). These “predatory 
pervert” discourses highlight the dangers of “stranger” offenders (Greer 2003, Lancaster 2011), 
and can thus act as vehicles for “community “togetherness,” (Jewkes 2015) and facilitate coded 
and implicit racism via discussions of “safety” and “quality of life” (Nagel 2003). 
Discussions of “specialized sexual perversion,” such as pedophilia, highlight white, male 
offenders (Lotz 1991, Kitzinger 2004, Lancaster 2011). Yet, the language of “predatory” 
sexuality is often associated with black men (Lundman 2003, Callanan 2012, Horeck 2013), and 
the 1990’s “superpredator” dialog presented young, inner-city (black) adolescent males as 
violent, dangerous, and morally depraved (Moriearty 2009). News media coverage of sexual 
predators lies at the intersection of these two potentially competing frames, and it remains 
unclear which they fall into. Such coverage thus provides the opportunity to better understand 
how offenders are represented to the public, and the potential ways in which those 
representations contribute to racialized and aged generalizations about sex offenders, in addition 
to victims. 
 
Constructing Sexual Predators  
 Overall, while research documents news media emphasis on sex crimes (Greer 2007, Greer 
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2012), types of victims (Kitzinger 2004, Greer 2007), and the impact of news media in shaping 
the overall “discursive field” of sex offender punishment (Lancaster 2011, Leon 2011, Krinsky 
2016), studies have yet to examine how media coverage of sexual predators, crimes, and victims 
contributes to evolving discourses of sexual violence. In particular, previous work is partial: it 
tends to disconnect or isolate concepts that are better understood together: victims and offenders, 
types of victims, age and gender, and legal and social institutions.  
 Motivated by research on cultural criminology (Ferrell and Websdale 1999) and news 
media framing (Benson and Saguy 2016) this article examines how news reports frame the 
sexually predatory by drawing attention to various characteristics of violence, victims, and 
offenders, and minimizing others. It draws on quantitative and qualitative content analysis of 323 
Los Angeles Times articles using the term “sexual predator” that were published between 1990-
2015.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data for this paper come from 323 news reports the used the term “sexual predator” 
published between 1990 and 2015 in The Los Angeles Times. The year 1990 is an ideal time to 
begin this sample, as it predates the rapid growth of new sex offender legislation between 1994 
and 1996, as well as growth in the use of the term “sexual predator” (Filler 2002). As a widely 
read, but also regional, publication, the Los Angeles Times is an ideal source to examine the way 
in which the term sexual predator intersects with both California and national politics. The 
Proquest News and Newspaper Database contains a full, searchable electronic archive of Los 
Angeles Times issues dating back to 1985. To create my sample, I searched for articles that used 
the term “sexual predator” anywhere in the text and were published any time between January 1, 
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1990, and October 5, 2015, when the search was conducted. This required using two databases: 
the pre-1997 full-text Los Angeles Times database, for results found between January 1, 1990 
and December 3, 1996; and the Los Angeles Times full text database, for results found between 
December 4, 1996, and October 5, 2015. The former search produced 60 results and the latter, 
345 results for a total preliminary sample of 405 articles. While the Los Angeles Times searches 
occasionally produced multiple versions of the same article (for “local” editions of the paper), 
my search produced a fair amount of non-relevant and redundant topics. As a result, I manually 
reviewed and eliminated duplicates, as well as unrelated entertainment reviews; science/animal 
articles; and news headline and byline summaries. After eliminating these articles, my final 
sample encompassed 323 articles.  
 
Coding 
I combine qualitative and quantitative analyses of media content in order to look both at 
agenda setting and framing of sexual predators. Scholars note that media analysis requires 
substantial interpretation and choice—in what counts as “important” text to analyze, which 
qualitative examples to select, and what narratives authors identify as meaningful and salient 
(Entman and Rojecki 2001). Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis mitigates this bias 
to some extent—quantitative analyses allow me to make broader claims, examine trends, and 
determine to what extent news media emphasize different ideas and concepts, while qualitative 
analyses capture the nuances in language and description in media representations of sexual 
predators.  
I used my existing knowledge of literature about the relationship between the media, 
crime, and sexuality; as well as California laws and policies, to create 79 variables with which to 
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quantitively code my analysis.4 I coded at the article level for all 323 of the articles in the 
sample. All variables in the sample were constructed as dichotomous, coded for whether or not 
the article about sexual predators mentioned that particular variable; thus, all codes are 
independent of one another. Where applicable, I coded and created variables matching the 
categories used in national crime data, while also accounting for legal specifics that shape the 
definitions of certain crimes (for example, anyone age 18 or up is considered an adult, legally 
speaking, and was coded as such). Matching variable categories to national crime data also 
facilitated comparison between the results of my analysis and official statistics on crime, which I 
discuss in more depth at the end of this section. To confirm intercoder reliability, a colleague 
randomly selected and coded 20 variables from 20 articles. I then compared each of these 
variables to my own coding using Reliability Calculator (Freelon 2010), which calculates 
Krippendorf’s Alpha, currently considered the standard measure of reliability for media content 
analyses (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007). Results confirmed associations between .8  and 1 for 
all variables, interpreted as “near perfect” agreement. 
In order to evaluate the types of crime and the degree of violence in articles that 
discussed sexual predators, I included several crime category variables in my initial analysis. 
Initial categories included whether an article mentioned—in the case of either an adult or child 
victim—kidnapping/abduction, battery/physical assault, abuse of any sort, sexual harassment, 
robbery, and a variety of sexual crimes, including sexual battery, nonconsensual oral sex, rape, 
or serial rape. I also coded for crimes with child victims, including molestation, child 
pornography, and lewd conduct with a child.  
 
4 All of these variables did not come up when I coded the articles, and many that did come up appeared only minimally. I discuss 
the variables relevant to my findings. 
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Based on the incidence of appearance and the definition of “violent crime” according to 
the National Crime and Victimization Survey (NCVS) and Uniform Crime Report (UCR) (the 
two main national crime reports collected by the US Department of Justice), I condensed these 
categories into four major areas of violent crime: murder, kidnapping (considered violent under 
California law, but not included in the NCVS or UCR), physical abuse/assault, and sexual 
assault. In the state of California, all sexual crimes against adults fall under the larger legal 
category of “sexual assault.” Similarly, all sexual crimes against children, including child 
molestation, fall under the category of “lewd or lascivious acts with a minor.” For this reason, a 
condensed variable for all sexual crimes for each age group proved to be ideal. 
I used three additional variables to measure the incidence of violent crime in the data. 
The first variable measured whether or not the article mentioned a repeat offender. The second 
was whether the article mentioned multiple victims (whether from the same offender or other 
offenders). Finally, I created variables to measure the relationship between victims and 
offenders: stranger, if the offender was unknown to the victim (which was often specifically 
mentioned), and friend or family, if the offender was a family member or acquaintance. The 
stranger variable is particularly important to the analysis, as understandings of what constitutes 
“predatory” behavior in SVP diagnoses and violent behavior in other contemporary sex offender 
laws is tied to victim offender relationships (D’Orazio, Arkowitz et al. 2009). Research indicates 
that, generally, stranger violence is considered more serious and “criminal” than violence 
between intimates (Hessick 2007). 
 In addition to crime variables, I constructed age, gender, and race variables that 
encompassed the major age categories of victims and offenders in the analysis. Due to the 
corresponding legal definition, any victim age 18 or above was coded as an adult. Oftentimes, 
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adult victim age was specifically mentioned, although sometimes the victim was simply referred 
to as an “adult.” If a victim was identified as “college-aged,” I put them in this category, as well. 
I also created variables for victims below age 12 and for victims aged 12-17. When specific age 
was not mentioned, anyone called a “child,” “young child,” “young boy,” or “young girl,” in the 
analysis fell into the under 12 category. In an effort to be conservative, anyone described as a 
“teenager” fell into the 12-17 category, and cases where victim age was unclear or not mentioned 
were coded as “missing.” These categories align with NCVS and UCR data collection; the 
NCVS collects data on individuals age 12 or above only, while the UCR has select data available 
on victims below age 12.  
Similarly, I created three age variables for offender age categories in the analysis: 
offender under age 30, offender age 30-39, and offender age 40 or above. These categories 
correspond generally with data from the UCR (Greenfeld 1997), but are slightly more broad 
(data there separate offender age into categories spanning five years, but for the purposes of the 
analysis, this level of detail was not necessary). I also created variables for victim and offender 
gender (male, female, or whether both male and female victims or offenders appeared in the 
same article), and variables for offender race. I coded for whether articles mentioned or pictured 
in photos if offenders were white, Black, Hispanic, or “other” race (including Asian and mixed 
race individuals). Because pictures required visual interpretation of race, I double checked this 
variable by looking up offenders by name to confirm my results, coding any instances where I 
could not confirm an offender’s race, or when race remained ambiguous, as missing. Although I 
also created categories to code for victim race, I found that this was mentioned rarely, if ever.  
 A few additional variables of note to the analysis were those measuring spaces classically 
thought of as “dangerous” within contemporary discussions of sexual assault and violent crime, 
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such as the Internet, schools, college campuses, and even churches (due to large clergy abuse 
scandals during the study time period). I also included a variable indicating whether the article 
discussed that sex offender laws should be less or more punitive, in order to gauge the tone of the 
dialog about sexual predators in media discourse. I exported and merged coded articles from 
Google forms to Excel, then imported that dataset into Stata statistical software for analysis. 
For qualitative analysis, I use discourse analysis to examine major frames that appeared 
when discussing sexual predators, specifically choices of words and quotes that demonstrated 
ideologies surrounding victims and sex offenders in the articles. This approach allowed me to 
critically examine the ways in which key themes—such as innocence, guilt, and deviance—
impact conceptions of sexual predators. I created Excel sheets organized by theme with 
quotations relevant to key concepts such as age, violence, gender, sexuality, and culpability.  
 
Comparative Statistics 
In order to evaluate the quantitative trends in this analysis, it is helpful to use comparative 
statistics, yet important to note limitations of national statistics on crime and of comparisons 
themselves. First, the NCVS and the UCR contain methodological and definitional differences: 
the NCVS includes estimates of both reported and unreported crimes from a nationally 
representative sample of U.S. households, while the UCR collects data on crimes recorded by the 
police and is based on the actual counts of offenses reported by law enforcement. The NCVS 
also excludes crimes against children under 12 years, although victimizations against these 
persons may be included in the UCR. The crimes measured in each are overlapping, but not 
identical—most importantly, the UCR does not include sexual assault, a variable extremely 
relevant to this analysis (Barnett-Ryan, Langton et al. 2014). Finally, and more sociologically 
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speaking, reporting of crime depends upon a number of factors, including the socioeconomic, 
racial, and gendered characteristics of police, victims, neighborhoods, etc. When viewing any 
crime statistics, it is important to keep these limitations in mind.  
There are also several important limitations when comparing the dataset in this analysis 
to national crime data. First, these datasets essentially measure separate things: the sample data 
looks at media framing, which we should expect to be substantively different than actual crime 
rates. Second, the sample data set covers a range of 25 years, but there are not enough 
observations in any single year to break down my data into a yearly unit of analysis for 
comparison. Finally, while I do my best to match all variables to national data, the strongest 
comparison for this analysis would be a uniform, consistent dataset. This simply does not exist. 
Regardless, the comparisons I include provide a way in which to conceptualize generally how 
media representation of crime, victims, and offenders compares to actual recorded incidences of 
violence, victimization, and crime perpetration, providing a useful starting point for analysis. 
 
FINDINGS 
The following section examines how Los Angeles Times articles represent sexual predator 
victims, crimes, and offenders. In the first section, I introduce overall statistics on the type of 
coverage included in articles using the term “sexual predator,” showing that they most often 
encompass violent, sexual crimes committed by repeat offenders, containing multiple victims, 
and committed by strangers. In the second section, I show that articles over-emphasize crimes 
against children (younger children in particular), relative to crime against adults. They sexualize 
crimes against child victims, using graphic depictions of violence to do so. Narratives present 
adult victims (the majority of whom are women) as responsible for their victimization, yet 
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discuss the protection of children as a collective national responsibility. The final section shows 
that articles use these same child victim narratives as a rhetorical tool to justify violence against 
sexual offenders. The cumulative effect of these results illustrates how media construct and 
reinforce hierarchized victimhood using child victims, and use child victim narratives to 
dehumanize offenders and generalize them as pedophilic. 
  
Persistent and Graphic Sexual Violence 
Figure 1 shows trends in the number of overall mentions of the term “sexual predator” 
over the sample time period. The number of mentions peaks in 1998, followed closely by 1996 
and 2002.  Table 1 provides overall statistics on all major relevant variables from the sample, 
which give an overall idea of major trends regarding age and gender of victims and offenders, as 
well as the distribution of crimes covered in the sample. From these initial trends, I move to 
more detailed qualitative and quantitative analyses of age, gender, and crime, discussing the way 
in which these factors intersect to produce a particular image of a “sexual predator.” 
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Figure 1: News Reporting on Sexual Predators, Los Angeles Times, 1990-2015 (N = 323) 
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Table 1: General Demographics, Los Angeles Times Reports on Sexual Predators, 1990-
2015  
 
 
    Victim Age
       Under age 12 80 (28%)
       Age 12-17 60 (21%)
       Age 18 or above 141 (50%)
(N=281)
    Offender Age
       Under age 30 34 (19%)
       Age 30-39 years 51 (28%)
       Age 40 or above 98 (54%)
(N=183)
    Victim Gender
       Male 64 (25%)
       Female 175 (68%)
       Both male and female mentioned 17 (7%)
(N=256)
    Offender Gender
       Male 248 (95%)
       Female 12 (5%)
       Both male and female mentioned 2 (1%)
(N=262)
    Offender Race
       White 68 (67%)
       Black 13 (13%)
       Hispanic 12 (12%)
       Other or multiple mentioned 8 (1%)
(N=101)
    Crime Categories
       Sexual assault 266 (83%)
       Murder 67 (21%)
       Kidnapping 48 (15%)
       Physical Abuse 30 (9%)
(N=323)
    Repeat Offenders
       Repeat Offenders 232 (72%)
(N=323)
    Multiple Victims
       Multiple Victims 222 (69%)
(N=323)
    Victim-Offender Relationship
       Acquaintance, friend, or family member 72 (40%)
       Stranger 107 (60%)
(N=179)
  
 
63 
Table 1 shows that articles in the sample focus on four major categories of violent crime: 
83% discuss sexual assault, 67% discuss murder, 48% discuss kidnapping, and 30% discuss 
physical abuse of some kind. Seventy-two percent of articles discuss repeat offenders, 79% of 
which mention sexual assault as a corresponding crime. However, as shown in Figure 2, when 
broken down by crime, repeat offenders showed up relatively evenly within each category, in 
fact appearing most (87 percent of the time) within articles about physical abuse. Similarly, 
while 69% of articles mention multiple victims, 79% of which mention sexual assault as a 
corresponding crime, Figure 3 shows that the distribution of articles discussing multiple victims 
was almost identical within the four most frequent crime categories that appeared in the analysis. 
National Crime Statistics from 2002 provide some perspective with which to view these results. 
In 2002, murder and forcible rape, which appear most in the sample data, accounted for less than 
1 percent of the offenses that made up the US Crime Index (Investigation 2002). Aggravated 
assault, which does not include child abuse, made up 7.5% of overall crime reported, a marked 
contrast to the 30% of articles about physical abuse in the data (which do include child abuse).  
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Figure 2: Repeat Offender Percentage within Crime Category, Los Angeles Times Reports 
on Sexual Predators, 1990-2015  
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Figure 3: Single v. Multiple Victims within Crime Category, Los Angeles Times Reports on 
Sexual Predators, 1990-2015  
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family members, friends, or acquaintances as offenders—a distortion of reality. National 
statistics on victimization show that offenders known to victims on average actually commit 
about 67% of murders (Investigation 2002), and committed, and between 70-80% percent of 
sexual assaults each year between 1993 and 2016 (Statistics 1993-2016) indicating a potentially 
exaggerated focus on attacks by strangers relative to their actual occurrence. Figure 4 shows the 
percentage breakdown of victim-offender relationship within each crime category. When broken 
down by crime, the percentage of articles featuring stranger offenders increases even more, to 86 
and 82 percent, respectively, within kidnapping and murder stories, and to 63% within stories of 
sexual and physical abuse.  
 
Figure 4: Relationship of Offender to Victim within Crime Category, Los Angeles Times 
Reports on Sexual Predators, 1990-2015  
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 Further analysis of article text demonstrates that graphic verbal descriptions accompany 
media emphasis on violent crime. In describing the murder of Anthony Michael Martinez, a child 
victim, several articles highlight his “naked” or “partially clad” body, “the duct tape used to bind 
[his] mouth, legs and hands,” and his “bound body, pulled naked from a sun-blasted desert 
ravine” (Reich and Simon 1997, Becerra 2002, Pugmire and Verhovek 2005, Panzar and Serna 
2015). Another story lists the names and details of crimes committed by sexual predators in 
Minnesota:  
Richard Enebak committed at least 37 sexual assaults between 1955 and 1969, many on 
young girls. In one rape, a 16-year-old girl suffered internal injuries, severe cuts and 
broken vertebrae that left her paralyzed...Charles Stone, a pedophile, admitted molesting 
as many as 200 young girls…Donald Martenies savagely raped a 7-year-old girl, then 
sewed up her wounds without anesthesia (Kuebelbeck 1993). 
Yet another article describes the “bloody form” of 12-year-old Robert Smith Thompson, who 
was raped, thrown out of a car, and run over (Becerra 2002). Graphic depictions of violence 
against children in particular appear regularly throughout the sample (Louise Roug and Haldane 
2000, Chu 2012).  
Thus, from the start, articles that mention sexual predators emphasize violent content and 
narratives. This is not necessarily surprising, but further analyses into how violent coverage 
intersects with age and gender of victims demonstrate important framing distinctions in these 
areas. 
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Emphasizing child victims: overall trends and sexualizing violence 
Among coverage of violent crime, articles focus more frequently on child victims than on 
adult victims. Figure 5 shows that articles are more likely to cover child victims in comparison to 
adults within three out of four violent crime categories. Non-sexual physical assault/abuse is the 
only category for which the percentage of adult victims exceeds that of children. Articles 
discussing sexual assault, while still featuring more child than adult victims, also featured the 
highest percentage of adult victims out of any crime category and were most likely to mention 
both adult and child victims in the same article. Still, the National Crime Victimization Survey 
indicates that, between 1996-2007, US adults aged 20-34 faced consistently higher rates of 
violent victimization (including both sexual assault and threats of sexual assault) than did those 
aged 12-19, and children under age 14 made up only 4.8% of murder victims overall between 
1980 and 2008 (Smith and Cooper 2013). In addition, while national crime data on children 
under age 12 is limited, official Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) indicate that only 34% of child 
sexual assault victims in the United States are under age 12 (Greenfeld 1997)—while 
representing 57% of the news sample (Table 1). 
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Figure 5: Victim Age Percentage within Crime Category, Los Angeles Times Reports on 
Sexual Predators, 1990-2015  
 
 
 
In addition, media emphasize large age gaps between victims and offenders. Overall, the sample 
is relatively evenly divided between offenders above age 40 and those below 40, with a slightly 
greater emphasis on the former (Table 1). Aside from a few years (1998 and 2001), this focus on 
older offenders remains consistent throughout the study time period (Figure 6). National data on 
age of sex offenders suggests that the sample over-represents older offenders—offenders over 
the age of 30 made up only 40% of victim-reported incidences of rape, sexual assault, and verbal 
threats of rape and/or sexual assault in 2002 (Greenfeld 1997). When victim age is cross-
referenced with offender age, articles are most likely to mention the youngest category of victims 
in conjunction with offenders above age 40—58% of articles about victims under age 12 mention 
offenders above age 40 (Figure 7).  
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Figure 6: News Reporting on Sexual Predators, Los Angeles Times 1990-2015, Offender 
Below Age 40 and Offenders Age 40 or Above (N = 183, number of articles that mention 
the age of offenders) 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of Offender Age Category by Victim Age Category, Los Angeles 
Times Reports on Sexual Predators, 1990-2015 
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Results of an additional logit analysis also suggest a potential correlation between 
coverage of sex crimes, murder, and child victims. Articles that mentioned child murder were 
1.77 times more likely to mention child sexual assault (P = 0.000). In contrast, articles that 
mentioned adult murder were not more likely to mention adult rape (in fact, they were less likely 
to mention it). Yet, in actual cases of child murder between 1980 and 1994, only three percent of 
child murders occurred with or preceded a sex offense (Jenkins 2004). 
Several articles also assume or imply, without supporting evidence, that child molestation 
precedes murder or abuse. An article about Michael Anthony Martinez, a ten-year-old victim, 
points out that, even when authorities were unable to say whether he had been molested or not, 
they “believe[d] the crime was the work of a practiced sexual predator” (Reich and Simon 1997). 
In a story about a different child assault, a man attacks and beats a five-year old and runs away. 
Although the assaulter did not attempt to remove the victim’s clothes or molest her, the article 
points out that sexual assault was the “likely intent” of the crime” (Garrison 2000). 
Coverage of the notorious case of Polly Klaas, who was abducted from her bedroom 
during a slumber party and eventually strangled to death, frequently lumps Klaas together with 
Megan Kanka (who was raped and murdered), referring to both as “classic” victims of sexual 
predators (Bornemeier 1996, Geller 1996, Press 1996). However, there was no evidence in the 
Klaas case that she was sexually assaulted. One article quotes the prosecution’s argument during 
the Klaas murder trial, stating that Klaas had to have been molested, despite a lack of physical 
evidence confirming this: “Burglars [my emphasis] don’t go into houses and tie up females with 
cut-up women’s undergarments” (Curtius 1996). The “undergarments” of which the prosecutor 
speaks were stockings—not necessarily indicative of sexual perversion, and certainly not 
evidence—in and of themselves—of sexual assault. Regardless, the jury found Allen guilty of 
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murder with special circumstances, including lewd acts against a child, and sentenced him to 
death.  
 
Privileging child victims over adult women: collective versus individual responsibility 
The emphasis on violence against children comes largely at the expense of adult women. 
The majority of adult victims in the sample are women (Table 1), which closely matches national 
data on victimization showing that from 1995 – 2010 women made up 91% of reported sexual 
assault victimizations (Barnett-Ryan, Langton et al. 2014). While the overall proportion of 
female to male victims remains relatively constant across crime categories in the sample data 
(when both gender and crime category are mentioned) (Figure 8), this relationship breaks down 
when age is introduced into the analysis. Figure 9, which examines the gender division of 
victims within the three sample age categories, shows that female victims are most likely to be 
above age 18, making up 81% of the victims in that age category, while coverage of child 
victims in the sample is more evenly divided by gender. Amongst victims under age 12, 49% 
were female and 40% male. This age category also had the highest percentage of articles that 
mentioned both male and female victims. When the child victim age categories are combined, 
females make up 54% of victims under age 18.  
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Figure 8: Victim Gender Percentage within Crime Category, Los Angeles Times Reports on 
Sexual Predators, 1990-2015  
 
 
Figure 9: Victim Gender Percentage within Age Category, Los Angeles Times Reports on 
Sexual Predators, 1990-2015  
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Relative to national statistics, the sample demonstrates a greater focus on male victims in 
every age category. BJS data indicates that only 27% of sexual crime victims under age 12 are 
male (sample data indicated 40%), 18% of victims aged 12-17 are male (sample data indicated 
38%), and 5% of victims 18 or older are male (sample data indicated 13%). Nationally, women 
make up 82% of victims under age 18—my news sample shows almost 30% fewer women 
victims than that (Snyder 2000). 
These gendered differences become more salient when viewed in conjunction with 
textual narratives that present child victims as “universal,” while delegitimizing the experiences 
of adult women. Articles present such victims as neither universally representative nor 
unequivocally innocent. They often detail victims’ sexual history, casting doubt upon their 
innocence. For example, a story about Chester DeWayne Turner, who raped and murdered at 
least ten women, states that four of his victims, “were prostitutes. Relatives said they had been 
driven to prostitution by drug addiction” (Rocha 2014). This description of the victims is the 
only one available in the article and presents a stark contrast to the description of the six-year old 
murder victim Jeffrey Vargo, killed by Kenneth Rasmusen, as a “precocious, brown-eyed boy” 
who experienced a “violent death” (Panzar and Serna 2015). The only description of the adult 
rape victims is that they were likely sex workers—perhaps driven to that line of work by drug 
addiction, but defined by their occupation nevertheless. Another story about a rape case 
describes how the attorney for the defendant attempted to seek a mistrial because one of the 
victims lied about her past as an adult film star (Krikorian 1997). In contrast to universalizing 
narratives of child victims, these narratives set adult women aside as different. 
Discussions of adult victims often arise from trial coverage, where articles detail court 
cases surrounding rapes and other sexual crimes. Media rhetoric in these instances reflects 
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courtroom deliberations and the legal strategy of defense attorneys, which is often to present the 
victim’s behavior as sexually “aggressive.” Several articles demonstrate, correspondingly, the 
way in which defense attorneys use the sexuality of women victims in order to undermine their 
credibility. A 2014 story about an alleged sexual assault by a male army General on a female 
subordinate officer states, “The defense portrayed the accuser as an ambitious and flirtatious 
officer who enjoyed sex with a dynamic general, only to react in rage…after realizing the general 
would not divorce his wife (Zucchino 2014). Another story about the trial of three men for the 
gang-rape of an Orange County woman points out that defense attorneys portrayed the 16-year-
old victim as “…a would-be porn actress who consented to an orgy and feigned unconsciousness 
for dramatic effect” (Luna 2005). In 1992, when Mike Tyson was accused of raping an 18-year-
old woman, his defense team described his accuser as “a spurned woman [with a lust for money] 
who sought Tyson's wealth but wound up with a one-night stand” (Gustkey 1992). These 
examples demonstrate the intersection of the law and media—article coverage reflects the 
content of legal cases, but, in the process, it repeats narratives that link the credibility of adult 
and even older teenage victims to their sexuality. 
While the sample rarely discusses adult, male victims, a notable exception is extensive 
coverage of four State Prison guards who facilitated the rape of a male inmate by another male 
inmate as “punishment” for kicking a female guard. Like in the stories about adult women 
victims, the defense attorney for the guards attacks the victim’s credibility, calling him a liar: 
“The only gainful employment [the alleged victim] ever had was as a drug dealer. He is a liar 
and a violent predator…Are you going to convict these men on [his word]?” (Arax 1999). 
Subsequent descriptions present the victim in more feminine ways, calling him “small,” 
“slender,” and “frail” (Arax and Gladstone 1998). Another story about several men who were 
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drugged, along with their girlfriends, by a date rapist, describes the men as being “rendered 
incapable of helping [their girlfriends] fend off attacks” (Krikorian 1997). Such representations 
emphasize the ways in which men victims (particularly of men offenders) fail to live up “classic” 
ideals of masculinity.   
In contrast adult male victims and teenage and adult women, who appear to bear 
responsibility for their victimization, protecting very young children from victimization is 
presented as a collective responsibility—"Holding aloft her son's red high-top sneakers, Helen 
Harlow said: ‘He could be anybody's child. He could be anybody's grandchild’” (Seigel 1990). 
As Bill Clinton signed Megan’s Law, he stated: “The law named for one child is now for every 
child. [This law will] tell a community when a dangerous sexual predator enters its midst. There 
is no greater right than the right to raise children in peace and safety” (Bornemeier 1996). 
Articles also emphasize the vulnerability of very young children: “The perils to children are 
many, not the least of which are adults who prey upon their innocence and, in ways we can only 
imagine, damage them forever in the blush of infancy, like stomping a flower before it blooms” 
(Martinez 2004).  
Correspondingly, articles use young child victims as a rhetorical tool to emphasize the 
monstrosity of sexual offenses. One article quotes a defense attorney’s closing arguments as to 
why his client, who kidnapped and murdered an adult woman, should not be deemed a sexual 
predator, by drawing distinctions between notorious murderers, several of whom killed children, 
and his client:  
‘We're not talking about good versus bad acts. We're talking about the worst of the bad 
acts: Ted Bundy: serial killer [and famed necrophiliac] from the Northwest. Richard 
Ramirez: The Night Stalker [who raped and murdered at least two children under the age 
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of ten, in addition to many adults]. Theodore Frank: The child sexual predator who killed 
[two-year-old] Amy Sue Sietz in this county.’ Pointing to [his client], sitting calmly at the 
defense table with his chin on his left hand, [the lawyer] proclaimed: ‘This young man is 
not in their class’ (Bray 1995).  
The defense attorney here contrasts his client’s acts, which are “bad,” with acts he considers 
worthy of the death penalty, focusing heavily on offenders who raped and murdered young 
children. A letter to the Editor of the LA Times on May 5, 2010 states, “We should treat sexual 
predators no different than murderers. Sexual predators should be put away for life. 
Period…Wake up America, and let’s protect our children” (Editor 2010). This comment not only 
argues that sexual predation is on par with murder, but applies this term to child victims 
exclusively, appealing to the public for their protection.  
 
Protecting child victims: justifying violence and dehumanizing offenders 
Such appeals feed into discourse that justifies physical violence against sexual predators 
in the name of protecting children. When asked to comment on the ethics of child sex offenders 
opting for chemical castration in exchange for release from indefinite confinement, state Senator 
Brad Owen says: “Voluntary mutilation is too good for sex offenders. It should be mandatory for 
these creeps” (Marosi 2001). Another Letter to the Editor states, “Molesting and raping children 
leaves scars for life; why shouldn't the perpetrator also have scars that remain for life?” (Editor 
1997). A local woman speaking in an article about a sexual predator who opted to be castrated in 
exchange for early release from prison states, “So what? Even if [the operation] does cleanse him 
of deviant thoughts, he still has to be punished for his crimes…He still hasn’t paid his debt to 
society for what he did to children. That’s the worst crime you could ever do” (Marosi 2001). 
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Thus, child victims often define the distinction between “bad” crimes and “the worst” crimes, the 
latter which justify extreme punishment.  
In addition to legally sanctioned punishments, several articles also mention the physical 
assault of sexual predators by everyday citizens—vigilante “justice.” One discusses the 
neighborhood apprehension of a man who exposed himself outside of a Roman Catholic high 
school—two men caught him and held him while the schoolgirls kicked and punched him, 
ultimately sending him to the hospital (Reuters 2003). Another piece details the trial of 
Washington state man who, enraged by the story of another sex offender in Idaho, found and 
murdered two sex offenders in his hometown using the state’s sex offender registry (Tizon 
2005). Rather than present these incidences as problematic, the first article almost gleefully 
discusses the “punishment” of the flasher, pointing out how the schoolgirls “took their revenge” 
(Reuters 2003), while the second uses the majority of article to discuss the crimes of the sex 
offender in Idaho that so outraged (and motivated) the double murderer (Tizon 2005).   
News articles also use child victims to demonstrate how “sick” offenders are—not to 
discuss treatment, but, rather, to illustrate that offenders do not deserve treatment, or are lucky to 
receive it, however punitive in nature it may be. One article asks a community advocate her 
thoughts about the ethics of civil confinement, and she responds: 
I'm always amazed about [questions concerning] the health and fairness for the 
criminal…My response is, why don't you go ask the children, the victims of these 
monsters what their lives will be like?...To keep these monsters in a hospital is pretty 
compassionate to me” (Bond 1996). 
A different article chastises the “misguided” efforts of providing treatment to sexual predators: 
“How much longer will we tolerate misguided judges who refuse to keep sexual predators locked 
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up, instead ordering probation or counseling based on the naive belief that there is a ‘cure’ for 
what therapists euphemistically call ‘inappropriate sexual urges?’” (Geller 1996). A letter to the 
editor on August 22, 2002 (Editor 2002) points out that sexual predators are not “normal” 
people, but “monsters”—and should thus be locked “in cages forever” (correspondingly, in 
quantitative analysis, articles that mentioned child sexual assault were 1.3 times more likely to 
also mention wanting harsher punishment for sex offenders (P=.000)). 
That many sexual predators were themselves victims of childhood sexual abuse at some 
point in time does not appear to make them worthy of sympathy—articles present the categories 
of victim and offender as mutually exclusive. One article discusses the sentencing to death of 
Jesse Timmendequas for the rape and murder of his neighbor, seven-year-old Megan Kanka (the 
namesake of “Megan’s Law,” which publicized and expanded sex offender registries across the 
United States). Despite trial testimony indicating that the defendant was both a sexual assault 
victim of his father and physical assault victim of this mother (“Carol Krych, a social worker 
called by the defense, told the jury that Timmendequas' mother beat him and once broke his arm 
with a wooden stick that family members called ‘the equalizer’…Timmendequas' brother, Paul, 
said he remembered the defendant screaming when he was locked up with his father…(Goldman 
1997), the jury sentenced Timmendequas to death, finding no mitigating circumstances for his 
crime. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION   
These results indicate that media coverage of sexual predators focuses most frequently on 
sexual assaults committed by repeat offenders and containing multiple victims, and kidnappings 
and murders committed by strangers. Coverage also overemphasizes crimes against children 
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under age 12, both relative to crimes against adults in the sample and relative to the incidence of 
crimes against children reported statistically. Articles frame the protection of children as a type 
of “collective” responsibility, using narratives of protection to justify violence against sexual 
predators. Narratives within these articles are graphically violent and often sexual, discussing 
male children almost 50 percent of the time. In contrast, the media discuss adult women less, 
and—when they do—frame these victims, even victims of serial rape, as responsible for their 
victimization. Coverage of offenders falls into overlapping predator tropes, both of violent 
criminals and child perverts. 
 
Violence, child victims, and sex 
 While it may initially appear unsurprising that media coverage of sexual predators focuses 
on sexual assault, results demonstrate that this coverage also focuses heavily on murder and 
kidnapping, which, statistically speaking, rarely overlap with sexual assault (Jenkins 2004). 
Coverage of these violent crimes also overlaps with offender characteristics such as repeat 
offending, being unknown to victims, and having multiple victims, serving to intensify 
representations of “extraordinary” violence in this instance (Naylor 2001). In contrast to past 
research, stranger offenders are most likely to be found in kidnapping and murder stories—not 
stories about sexual assault (Wilson and Silverman 2002). These results indicate a general 
conflation of violence with sexual violence in the case of sexual predators, in effect expanding 
the range of crimes that constitutes sexually predatory behavior (Levine 2006).  
In addition, articles about sexual predators, in both covering various types of violence 
against younger children and by narrating stories of child victims in particular ways, produce 
aged understandings of what constitutes sexual predator victims. While child and adult victims 
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receive equal amounts of total coverage during the entire study period, in years where articles 
focus more on child victims, they focus less on adult victims, and vice versa. This indicates that 
media choose between adult and child victims when determining which vulnerable victims to 
present, rather than, for example, focusing on stories of both adult and child victims during any 
particular year (Lynch 2002). This finding builds on previous work theorizing the construction of 
“ideal” victimhood (Christie 1986), demonstrating how child victims fit into this framework. 
When articles do focus on younger victims, they tend to combine various components of violent 
crime (murder with multiple victims, murder and rape, kidnapping by strangers, etc.) indicating 
that reporting of crimes with “notable circumstances” extends beyond adult rape victims (Meyers 
1996) and reinforcing tropes that violence against children happens outside of families, rather 
than within them (Kitzinger 2004). 
The association found between child murder and child sexual assault in LA Times 
coverage, combined with associated narratives of graphic violence, further suggest that media 
sexualize both crimes against children and child victims. Graphically describing violence against 
children while speculating about its sexual intent eroticizes attraction to children (while 
condemning it). Child murders in this context inevitably become sex crimes, as the case of Polly 
Klaas demonstrates. Levine (2006) points out that this same conflation occurred in the abduction 
and murder of child victim Adam Walsh (who was not mentioned in the sample). After his son’s 
abduction, Walsh’s father played an integral role in pushing forward federal sex offender laws, 
even though there was neither “suspicion nor evidence of sex” in Walsh’s case (24). This is 
significant, because “When we speak of the unspeakable, we keep the speaking going” (Kincaid 
1998). Media coverage of sexual predators, by reporting in this manner, produces its very own 
narratives of violence and child sexualization. As the Walsh case demonstrates, these narratives 
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have far-reaching impacts—some of them legislative. 
 
Gender and hierarchies of victimhood  
 Media coverage in this instance is also gendered. While the vast majority of adult victims 
in the sample are women, almost 50% of victims under age 12 in the sample are boys. This 
finding, in conjunction with qualitative evidence of how the media emphasize the “universality” 
of child victims, initially suggests that gender plays less of a role in coverage of child victims 
than it does in that of adults, supporting notions of the “asexual” child victim (Kincaid 1998). 
However, when viewed in conjunction with graphic narrative descriptions of violence against 
children, many of whom are boys, this finding also potentially indicates that media believe this 
type of assault has more “shock value” than crimes against younger girls. Given that victims 
younger than age 12 are almost always mentioned in conjunction with offenders above age 40 in 
the sample, this finding also supports notions that pedophiles are most likely to be men who 
offend against boys, which is not statistically the case (Kitzinger 2004), and that the term sexual 
predator is, in many ways, synonymous with the term pedophile.  
Coverage of adult victims adds an additional gendered component to the results by 
underrepresenting and effeminizing men who are victims of men (Snyder 2000), and “de-
universalizing” adult women victims, presenting them as neither broadly appealing nor 
unequivocally innocent. This finding aligns with understandings that “true” victims of sex crimes 
must be non-sexual, something of which only children are capable (Krinsky 2016), and suggests 
that perhaps children represent the “purest” form of blameless victim (Dunn 2008). Given the 
severity of crimes covered in the sample (murder and serial rape, for example), framing of adult 
women as unsympathetic in this case remains somewhat surprising, and indicates that the 
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threshold for being a vulnerable victim has limitations for this group that it does not appear to 
have for children (Quinn, Forsyth et al. 2004). Thus, adult females are likely to remain “impure” 
and therefore blamable victims to a much higher degree (Dunn 2008). Masculinity adds an 
additional layer to constructions of victim legitimacy. To the extent that adult men victims fail to 
live up to masculine, heterosexual ideals, their victim status is devalued similarly to that of adult 
women. 
Yet, it is notable and unmentioned in previous research that the narratives from which 
discussions of adult victims arise in the sample are, most frequently, legal ones. In recounting the 
trials of rapists, articles frequently detail defense attorney strategies that sexualize adult victims 
to undermine their credibility. In so doing, they introduce victim sexual history as a factor that 
impacts victim innocence, which simply never occurs in the case of child victims. While past 
research notes that media reproduction of political and legal images can define criminal 
subcultures (Ferrell and Websdale 1999) this result suggests that it does so for victims, as well. 
Future research should examine the extent to which recent events are leading to shifts in 
victim narratives. The surge in use of the term “sexual predator” that arose with the advent of the 
#MeToo movement, combined with its emphasis on the legitimacy of the stories of adult women 
victims, could lead to a decrease in this type of “slut shaming.” Catharine MacKinnon notes that 
the #MeToo movement has succeeded where the law previously failed in eroding the “disbelief 
and trivializing dehumanization” of sexual harassment victims (MacKinnon 2018). Recent work 
by Saguy (2018) suggests that French cultural attitudes about sexual consent and coercion shifted 
in response to 2011 news media reporting about the sexual assault charges brought against then-
Presidential candidate Dominique Strauss Kahn. Changing news media and cultural discussions 
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about what constitutes “legitimate” victimization and victimhood may thus result in shifting 
constructions of sexually predatory behavior. 
 
Violence, victims, and conceptualizing the sexual predator  
 These changing news media discussions may also result in shifting constructions of 
sexual predator offenders. LA Times framing of sexual predators presents them as a combination 
of various “predator” interpretations—“predatory perverts” in their focus on child victims 
(Lancaster 2011), yet highly violent and dangerous, in line with previous (and more racialized) 
understandings of “super predators” (Moriearty 2009). Narratively, it is this combination of 
vulnerable victims with perceived acts of extreme sexual violence that justifies violent treatment 
of sexual predators at both the popular and state level. Within this dialogue, sexual predators 
remain mostly white men. Yet, using “innocent” victims as the justification for violence against 
sexually “deviant” individuals parallels the discourse used to justify the lynching of thousands of 
black men in the Reconstruction Era South (and up until today). Sexual predator discourse shares 
other violent elements of that era, most notably an emphasis on castration as a way to “treat” or 
neutralize the sexual deviance of such individuals (Sexually Violent Predators in California with 
victims under the age of 13 face mandatory chemical castration (via anti androgen hormonal 
therapy) or voluntary surgical castration (Scott and Holmberg, 2003)).  
Within such narratives and policies, protecting children thus becomes a shared practice 
that “help[s] the white middle class feel a sense of community, exert a sense of sexual hygiene 
and moral discipline…and stake its claim to being the universal class, the one whose sense of 
danger, morality, and justice will serve as norm for all society” (Lancaster 2011). As such, 
children may represent the ultimate symbolic victims, a universally accessible, ideal, and 
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blameless victim frame (Christie 1986, Best 1997). But will narratives about protecting women 
have the same impact? Inasmuch as adult victims can be impugned, it seems doubtful that they 
will ever have the same universal appeal. 
 
Implications and moving forward 
These results have important substantive and methodological implications. California’s 
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) law reflects the most extreme regulation in a series of sex 
offender laws implemented in the state over the past 25 years, yet the California law and others 
like it continue to withstand legal and political challenges (Friedland 1999, Brakel and 
Cavanaugh Jr 2000, Cantone 2008). As others have pointed out, “The virulent politics [of SVP 
laws] make even the study or discussion of alternative approaches to sexual violence seen to be a 
third-rail issues—instant political death for anyone proposing serious consideration of alternative 
approaches” (Janus 2006).  
The 2006 amplification of California’s SVP law (which reduced the number of qualifying 
sex offenses from two to one) via voter-enacted Proposition 83 suggests that public opinion can 
play far more than a peripheral role in sex offender statutes. The way in which media frame 
various aspects of sexual crime thus represents far more than a “distraction” from cultural and 
political issues (Dowler, Fleming et al. 2006)—it constitutes a potentially vital component of 
how the public construct understandings and make meaning of the sexually predatory. These 
understandings likely impact victims—diminishing the “right” to victimhood for some, while 
elevating the victim status of others—as well as offenders, who wind up subject to both 
community and state-sanctioned violence. While this study cannot definitively say whether or 
not that is the case, this area warrants further research and analysis. 
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 Methodologically, this study shows that the partial nature of much previous work on media 
and crime can conceal valuable information about victims and offenders. The combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods in this analysis demonstrates that looking at media content 
alone (without examining rhetoric) and failing to disaggregate categories such as “child victim” 
and “violent crime,” cannot give a full picture of how news media frame sexual predation. It is 
thus important for future studies to look both between and within categories when analyzing 
crime—we cannot understand offenders without victims, nor can we generalize either of those 
categories without looking at their nuance. This is particularly important in the case of sex 
crimes, where victim status has historically been privileged amongst some groups, while denied 
to others (Collins 2004). In addition, the use of national statistics in this analysis, while not a 
perfect comparative measure, provides vital sociological perspective with which to view the 
results. When discussing media coverage as a cultural arena, such measures indicate how large 
the differences between actual statistics and such coverage actually are.  
It is important to note that these results apply specifically to sexual predator discourse 
and the news media content analyzed in this study. “Contemporary” media is a broad and 
evolving category. In order to study such a long time period, print news provided the most 
constant source of media coverage in this case. However, scholars point out the ways in which 
the diffusion of media across communication technologies, particularly the advent of social 
media, has only further complicated understandings of media influence on “society” (Fischel 
2016). Social media also provides an outlet for the perspectives of sexual offenders that did not 
previously exist, usually in the form of Facebook and online support groups. Future studies 
should thus look at how electronic and social media both socially organize understandings of 
deviance and also may provide space for oppositional narratives that major media outlets do not 
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take up.  
A number of themes I initially coded for in the data arose little or not at all in content 
analysis, including several areas where I theorized that discussions of victims might appear. Less 
than 4% of articles mentioned the Internet and less than 1% mentioned chatrooms, even though 
Wolak et al. (2007) find that 13% of youth Internet users received unwanted sexual solicitations 
in 2005. While about 10% of articles mentioned schools, less than 2% of articles discussed abuse 
by teachers or peer abuse/assault, including college sexual assault, yet Kilpatrick et al. (2007) 
find that in 2006 alone, 5.2% of college women were raped. Finally, only about 4% of articles 
discussed abuse of children by coaches and clergy, despite several somewhat infamous abuse 
stories in these areas occurring within the study time period (for example, revelations of 
systematic sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests, as well as the Pennsylvania State 
University abuse scandal where former assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky was found to 
have molested and raped at least ten young boys over the course of his career). It is possible that 
these spaces and scenarios are for some reason seen as less “predatory” (sexual assault on 
campus usually involves adult victims who are close in age), but additional research should 
examine why news media discussion of sexual predators may not touch upon these issues.   
Overall, this study demonstrates that sexual predator discourse, while currently “having a 
moment,” is not a new phenomenon. News media has set a violent, aged, and gendered agenda 
for this term, and creates images of both victims and sexual predators in the process. These 
images can feed back into law and political discourse, with potentially far-reaching effects—
from the potential for radical feminist change, to the ever more extreme regulation of sex and 
sexuality. As changing cultural events continue to impact dialogues surrounding sexual crime, it 
is these same images that will both constitute and reflect the “sexual predators” of our time. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
From Treatment to Punishment: Law, Medicine, and Competing Logics in California’s  
 
Civil Commitment Program 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Existing literature argues that Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) laws, which confine and 
treat various “mentally disordered” sex offenders for indefinite periods of time, constitute 
punishment disguised as medical treatment (Douard 2008, Janus 2006). Yet we know little about 
how SVP treatment and evaluation processes function, or how medical-legal interactions 
structure treatment environments in punitive ways. Using observation of one three-week-long 
Sexually Violent Predator trial; in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 12 medical and legal 
SVP experts; 70 hours of participant observation over 24 months of at a statewide sex offender 
management coalition and sex offender advocacy group; and analysis of primary documents 
relating to California’s SVP Program, I examine SVP treatment processes at interpersonal and 
institutional levels. I find that three factors transform treatment into punishment: 1) institutional 
inefficiencies, such as staffing shortages and treatment inconsistencies, that make accessing and 
successfully completing treatment almost impossible, 2) stigma created by the sexual predator 
label that impacts treatment processes, and 3) the subordination of medical and clinical priorities 
to legal and punitive priorities. These results demonstrate how medical-legal interactions can 
shape treatment environments in punitive ways, and how the narrative of treatment increasingly 
functions to exclude and punish undesirable populations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) laws emerged in the 1990’s amongst a profusion of new 
sex offender laws and regulations in the United States, including expanding public registration 
and notification, extended sentencing, and longer probation sentences for offenders convicted of 
sexual crimes (Meiners 2009, Pickett, Mancini, and Mears 2013). SVP laws deem certain types 
of offenders “mentally disordered;” possessing sexual pathologies that make them predisposed to 
continue offending (for example, pedophilia and sexual sadism). This mental diagnosis justifies 
their indefinite confinement in mental hospitals after they serve criminal sentences.  
This body of laws, also referred to as “civil commitment” laws, rely on the provision of 
treatment for Constitutional legitimacy: SVPs are confined for the sake of public safety while 
they undergo treatment for their disorder(s) (Janus 2004). Treatment, however, is voluntary, 
because the state cannot mandate that offenders participate (Miller 2010). Yet, without 
successfully completing treatment, patients are rarely, if ever, eligible for release. Even when 
they do participate in treatment, “success” is rare: by 2006, less than 10% of SVPs nationally had 
been released (Gookin 2007). 
 Both medical and legal literature critique civil commitment laws, pointing out that, 
amongst other issues, they are a form of preventative detention, they violate double jeopardy and 
due process, and they do not meet the criteria for clear diagnosis of a mental illness (Brakel and 
Cavanaugh Jr 2000, Cantone 2008, Friedland 1999, Testa and West 2010). Additional work 
argues that such laws are cruel and dehumanizing, justifying indefinite confinement for a group 
of people considered “monstrous,” unpalatable, and largely unsympathetic (Douard 2008). 
Others point out that the science of psychiatry legitimates and neutralizes their underlying 
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emotional, punitive, and political undercurrents of SVP proceedings and laws (Janus 2000, 
Douard and Schultz 2012). 
A connecting thread amongst objections to SVP laws is that they constitute a form of 
extreme punishment disguised as treatment, setting the precedent for preventative detention of 
“undesirable” groups of individuals on a wide scale (Prentky et al. 2006). Yet the majority of 
literature in this area is theoretical, not empirical—it examines neither how treatment functions 
within this context, nor the institutional and social processes that might make treatment punitive. 
As ideologies of treatment become increasingly integrated into law and population management 
(Sweet 2018), information about these processes can add valuable information to how we 
understand this integration and its implications—particularly for marginalized groups. 
In order to fill this gap in empirical research, I draw on multilevel analysis of California’s 
SVP law to examine how medical and legal interactions transform the treatment of sexual 
predators into punishment. Using observation of one three-week-long Sexually Violent Predator 
trial; in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 12 medical and legal SVP experts; 70 hours of 
participant observation over 24 months of at a statewide sex offender management coalition and 
sex offender advocacy group; and analysis of primary documents relating to California’s SVP 
Program, I examine these processes at interpersonal and institutional levels. I find that three 
factors transform treatment into punishment: 1) institutional inefficiencies, such as staffing 
shortages and treatment inconsistencies, that make accessing and successfully completing 
treatment almost impossible, 2) stigma created by the sexual predator label that impacts 
treatment processes, and 3) the subordination of medical and clinical priorities to legal and 
punitive priorities. These results demonstrate how medical-legal interactions can shape treatment 
  
 
103 
environments in punitive ways, and how the narrative of treatment increasingly functions to 
exclude and punish undesirable populations. 
 
BACKGROUND 
California’s enacted the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act in 1996. The law created, 
labeled, and classified a “Sexually Violent Predator” as “a person convicted of a sexually violent 
offense against one or more victims, and/[or] who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes 
the person a danger to the health and safety of others, in that it is likely that he or she will engage 
in sexually violent predatory behavior” (D’Orazio et al. 2009). Courts assign SVP designations 
for repeat offenses the law statutorily defines as forceful, violent, or menacing (for example: rape 
or sodomy). Alternatively, the law automatically considers offenders who commit any sex crimes 
against victims under the age of 14 eligible for SVP designation.  
A mental health diagnosis is integral to the law, which is civil, rather than criminal. In 
contrast to criminal laws, which are designed to punish various crimes, civil laws are designed to 
regulate behavior and prevent future harm, often imposing mandatory commitment for mental 
illness, developmental disability, or substance addiction. In this case, offenders first serve 
criminal penalties, and, shortly before release, those convicted of sexual offenses are evaluated to 
identify potential SVP qualification. Qualifying inmates undergo a series of evaluations by 
licensed psychiatrists or psychologists, and, if they are determined to meet the SVP criteria, are 
referred to the district attorney or county counsel of the county where the current controlling 
offense occurred.  
At this point, inmates must go through civil commitment hearing that determines whether 
there are sufficient facts to designate them an SVP and confine them at Coalinga State Hospital 
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(CHS), a California facility built in 2005 specifically to house and treat SVPs. Individuals remain 
in custody at Coalinga while awaiting this hearing. During this time, they may engage in 
treatment if they wish (D’Orazio et al. 2009). Often, SVPs remain in the facility for years 
awaiting trial, either due to administrative backlog, legal advice, or a variety of other factors 
(May 2018). The SVP hearing can be a judge or a jury trial, and to be determined an SVP, either 
must decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual meets SVP criteria (jury decisions 
must be unanimous).  
Those found to be SVPs are sent back to CHS, where it is suggested that they participate 
in treatment, and they can petition the court for release on a yearly basis. However, because 
SVPs are civilly, rather than criminally, committed, and because they have already served 
criminal sentences, California law gives patients the legal right to refuse treatment. The 
treatment program at Coalinga is called the “Phase Program.” It consists of five phases, four 
inpatient and one outpatient, to be completed after release. Treatment involves group therapy 
sessions, sexual arousal modification treatment, polygraph testing, and the use of anti-androgen 
hormonal therapies and serotonin-enhancing medications (SSRIs) to reduce “deviant” arousal 
(D’Orazio et al. 2009). 
 
LITERATURE 
To understand the institutional and social processes that shape SVP treatment, I draw on 
three bodies of literature. These include legal and medical critiques of SVP law and treatment 
(Janus 2000, Janus and Prentky 2008, Miller 2010), work on stigma, labeling, and categorization 
(Douard 2008, Goffman 2009, Link and Phelan 2001), and literature on medicalization and the 
law (Conrad 2005, Foucault 1990). 
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Treatment or Punishment? Legal and Medical Critiques of SVP Treatment 
A large body of legal and medical literature critique civil commitment laws. Legal work 
argues that the medical model underlying such laws sets a precedent for preventative detention, 
violates double jeopardy, and violates due process, because defendants serve criminal, and then 
civil, sentences (Brakel and Cavanaugh Jr 2000, Cantone 2008, Friedland 1999). Such arguments 
have thus far withstood legal challenges because civil commitment is by definition treatment, 
and not punishment (Janus 2000). Additional research disagrees with the mental health diagnoses 
assigned to sexual predators specifically, who often do not meet any clear criteria for a 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) diagnosis. After pedophilia, 
psychiatrists often use “paraphilia not otherwise specified” or “antisocial personality disorder” to 
justify civil commitment, both of which are broad categories that encompass a wide range of 
sexual disorders (Testa and West 2010). The American Psychiatric Association now formally 
opposes the use of sexual predator commitment laws because of such diagnostic concerns 
(Sreenivasan, Frances, and Weinberger 2010). 
Prentky et al. (2008) argue that the continued existence of such laws, despite these legal 
and medical criticisms, demonstrates that they are a form of punishment “disguised” as 
treatment. Yet how the interactive and structural processes and components of treatment 
facilitate this transformation remains unclear (Miller 2010). One potential way this might occur 
is through disincentives for treatment participation within the civil commitment context. Miller 
discusses the “paradox” of SVP treatment: treatment “success” requires offenders to discuss past 
sexual transgressions and fantasies, but such admissions are not protected by confidentiality, and 
can subsequently be used in hearings to justify continued confinement. We do not yet know how 
legal and medical experts navigate this paradox.  
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Professional assessments of treatment performance also form key evidential components 
of commitment hearings, and may impact treatment (Janus and Prentky 2008). Because 
prosecutors rely on such assessments to demonstrate that SVPs do not meet the criteria for 
release, it is possible that defense attorneys may advise SVP clients to forgo treatment, assuming 
that treatment failure will negatively impact their cases more than treatment non-participation 
(Miller 2010). The use of the Static-99 actuarial test in SVP evaluation and treatment may also 
play a role in making treatment punitive. This test classifies sex offenders into various risk 
categories by measuring a number of unchanging variables that predict sexual and violent 
recidivism in adult male sex offenders, including prior sexual offenses, relationship history, and 
age (Hanson 2006). Yet, aside from age, an offender’s score never changes, meaning that one 
major evaluative element in SVP treatment success is not actually impacted by treatment 
participation.  
Additional work points out potential institutional issues with SVP treatment. One such 
issue is that the cost of inpatient civil commitment treatment (in contrast to outpatient treatment 
in community programs or inpatient treatment in correctional programs), is expensive, and 
diverts resources away from other mental health and sex offender management programs that 
could reach a wider scope of offenders (Janus 2000). Coalinga State Hospital has also been 
criticized for staff shortages and its 250 million dollar per year operating budget, because so few 
patients have successfully completed treatment and been released (Mays 2018). Yet no empirical 
work exists that examines how these staff shortages or other institutional efficiencies delay or 
shape treatment.  
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Stigma, Labeling, and Categorization as Potential Treatment Barriers 
 
Another potential process that may impede treatment is the labeling and categorization 
that occurs when “sexually violent predator” becomes a legal and medical category. Goffman’s 
(2009) classic theory of stigma points out how certain attributes of identity can result in negative 
stereotyping. Link and Phelan (2001) further state that labels link individuals to the “set of 
undesirable characteristics” that form those stereotypes—the very act of labeling creates 
difference and, subsequently, hierarchies. In the case of sexual predators and sex offenders more 
broadly, medical language often comes to take on symbolic meaning—“pervert” began as 
medical diagnosis, yet the term has a far broader meaning (Jenkins 2004). Risk assessment 
models, or actuarial tests that are used to categorize and measure dangerousness in offenders, are 
often presented as neutral or devoid of emotions; an objective way to make sex offender policy 
(Janus and Prentky 2008), yet Douard (2008) argues that assessments that medically label sex 
offenders also function as cultural narratives that frame them as monstrous, unable to control 
their impulses, and unworthy of sympathy. The medical diagnosis of sexual predator thus 
functions as an ideology that produces norms, exclusions, and hierarchies of worthiness (Kunzel 
2017: 239).  
While Douard (2008) discusses how the dehumanization associated with this label 
justifies the deprivation of sexual predators’ rights, he does not examine how this labeling might 
function within a treatment or rehabilitative programming context. This is particularly important 
because research finds that agreement with stereotypes can promote strong reactions and 
discrimination against stigmatized groups that reduce the likelihood of helping behavior 
(Corrigan and Matthews 2003, Corrigan and Watson 2002), and because sex crimes tend to elicit 
heightened emotions such as fear and distress (Rogers and Ferguson 2011). The stigma of being 
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labeled a sex offender has a number of subsequent impacts: it can result in loss of relationships, 
employment, and housing, and physical and verbal assaults amongst those on the sex offender 
registry (Tewksbury 2005, 2012), and social exclusion and abuse for sex offenders within 
prisons (Ricciardelli and Moir 2013).  
Yet, we know very little about how this stigma impacts treatment. One study by Jahnke 
and Hoyer (2013) finds that pedophiles can feel stereotyped and looked down upon by treatment 
providers, but this study looks only at outpatient sex offender treatment programs, and not at 
how stigma might function within an institutional treatment context. D’Orazio et. al (2009) 
commenting on SVP treatment specifically, point out that: 
[In order for treatment to be effective] the civil commitment context must be non-
punitive, respectful, and supportive of change. The extremely negative stigma and 
shaming that accompanies the label, “Sexually Violent Predator” provokes negative 
responses that [may prevent this].  
Such labeling may also extend to courtroom procedures that evaluate treatment 
“success.” Walsh (1990) finds that in felony sexual assault cases, the labeling of sex offenders 
with a sexual pathology makes it over twice as likely for those offenders to be incarcerated 
compared to those who were not given a diagnostic label. In fact, in jury trials, a diagnosis by a 
psychiatrist of “sexual deviancy” can have a greater impact on trial outcomes than actual trial-
related factors (Konecni, Mulcahy, and Ebbesen 1980). Work specifically on Sexually Violent 
Predators finds jurors more than twice as likely to deny them parole compared to convicted 
felons, given identical case conditions, and that this label also makes jurors more likely to 
convict offenders (Lieberman and Krauss 2009, Scurich and Monahan 2016). However, both of 
these studies used mock SVP juries, not actual jurors or trial evidence.  
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Similar to juries, judges also display bias. Bumby and Maddox (1999) point out that, in 
sexual offense cases, it is more difficult for judges to maintain neutrality and sideline emotions, 
particularly because they feel public scrutiny and pressure to mete out harsh punishments. False 
beliefs about sex offender recidivism and responsiveness may contribute to this bias. Lave 
(2011) refers to this as the “myth of inevitable recidivism”—despite empirical research 
demonstrating that recidivism rates for sex offenders are much lower compared to other crimes 
(Hanson and Morton-Bourgon 2009, Scurich and Krauss 2014), the idea that sex offenders are 
likely to recidivate remains widespread and salient (Levenson, D'Amora, and Hern 2007). This 
belief goes hand in hand with the notion that treatment is ineffective (La Fond 2005). The stigma 
and label associated with SVP status, then, may impact treatment and evaluation within both the 
medical and legal context.  
 
Science, Medicine, and Law in SVP Cases 
Medical sociologists theorize that medical knowledge, authority, and technologies are 
important sites of social control (Parsons 1951). Medicine began to define and code the “sexually 
peculiar” in the 20th century, and legal text increasingly integrated these medicalized 
understandings of sexual deviance (Conrad and Schneider 1980, 1992, Eskridge 2008, Foucault 
1990). The law also began to mandate medical treatments for sexual deviance. These methods 
included therapy, orchiectomy (removal of the ovaries), castration, and hormone administration, 
amongst others (Ordover 2003, Rachman and Teasdale 1969, Valocchi 1999). As changing 
norms shifted both understandings of sexual deviance and its medical treatment over the 
twentieth century, accompanying legal responses and treatments shifted, as well.  
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Medical diagnosis remains integral to the legal regulation of sex, in particular civil 
commitment laws (Levine 2006). In the case of civil commitment, the law preceded medical 
diagnosis—legislatures created the SVP category and then turned to medicine to justify it (Leon 
2011, Vogler 2018)). Courts subsequently began to use forensic science and expertise to 
formalize this category, leaving forensic experts with the responsibility of finding medical 
criteria that aligned with legal specifications (Janus and Prentky 2008). They began and continue 
to do so largely with risk-assessment tools—supposedly neutral actuarial assessments that 
classify offenders based on the imminent danger they pose to themselves and others (Haggerty 
and Ericson 2000, Garland 2001). Sweet (2015) points out that in contemporary discourses of 
medicalization, risks become “medicalized products” that experts both create and employ, 
distilling complex social factors into “rationalized calculations.” As courts invoke science to 
justify their decisions, such calculations become reworked into legal logics (Fischel 2016, Moore 
and Valverde 2000, Vogler 2018). Douard and Schultz (2012) and Vogler (2018) argue that the 
cooperation of forensic psychiatry with law in this instance is thus responsible for both justifying 
punitive policy and permanently labeling SVPs as “incurable.”  
 Despite these theoretical analyses, we know little about the processes and interactions 
through which this occurs. In particular, studies have yet to examine how legal and medical 
actors negotiate and interpret their roles and responsibilities in the SVP context. This is relevant 
because it can shed light on the mechanisms through which treatment becomes punitive (or 
functions effectively). Orr (2003) points out that the sociology of diagnosis can provide tools to 
examine the way that medical discourse defines social problems (Sweet 2018). I examine SVP 
diagnosis and treatment in order to better understand how medical and legal discourses impact 
the construction of this social problem.   
  
 
111 
DATA AND METHODS 
This article draws on observation of one three-week-long Sexually Violent Predator trial; 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with medical and legal SVP experts (N=12); and 70 hours of 
participant observation over 24 months at the California Coalition on Sexual Offending 
(CCOSO) and the Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offender Laws (ACSOL) meetings and online 
forums, including content analysis of meeting materials. I also analyzed primary documents 
relating to the California Department of Mental Health and Coalinga State Hospital, including a 
2015 state audit of California’s Sex Offender Commitment Program and a 2019 State Hospital 
Budget Report. This multilevel approach allowed me to explore the interaction of medicine and 
law, observing professional and practical discourses in official documents, expert settings, and 
via the narratives of those who employed them. 
In order to evaluate how medical and legal discourses about SVPs intersected in a 
courtroom environment, I observed one full-length SVP trial in Orange County, CA from start to 
finish, including jury selection and interviews with the jury after they determined a verdict. The 
trial began on February 16, 2017 and ended on March 6, 2017, lasting approximately 40 hours. 
The purpose of the trial was to determine if Ronald Rogers, a convicted sex offender, should 
remain civilly committed at Coalinga State Hospital, where he had been committed for 21 years 
prior. The little research that exists on court proceedings, particularly SVP proceedings, tends to 
use trial transcripts, rather than participant observation (Vogler 2018). The unique and important 
experience of actual trial observation allowed me to view the testimony of expert medical 
witnesses, interactions between the defense attorney and the prosecutor, and jury reaction to 
expert testimony. While not a complete trial ethnography, these observations demonstrate the 
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way in which the trends identified in my other data arise and play out on an actual case-by-case 
basis, contributing valuable information to this analysis. 
In order to examine how medical and legal actors negotiated the institutional and 
emotional issues surrounding SVP treatment, I also conducted 12 semi-structured expert 
interviews for my analysis. To recruit participants, I used respondent-driven sampling from my 
field sites, as well information from my own general research to identify prominent doctors, 
lawyers, and other professionals working on SVP-related issues. Respondents were given the 
choice of identifying themselves or remaining anonymous for interviews, which were 60-90 
minutes long. I created pseudonyms for the experts who chose to remain anonymous. Figure 1 
lists respondent names and pseudonyms, along with their occupations. 
Figure 1: Expert Names* and Occupations 
 
  
                     *Pseudonym 
Half of the interviews were conducted in person, and half were conducted via Skype or 
phone due to location and travel restrictions. Interviews included questions about the work each 
person did, how that work related to SVP treatment and/or legislation, experiences working in 
the area of SVPs, what challenges (personal and professional) each interviewee faced working in 
Name Occupation
Christina Behle Attorney
Janice Bellucci Attorney
John Brown* Judge
James Dabney Judge
Cecelia Groman Clinical Expert
Leesl Herman Clinical Expert
Hy Malinek Forensic Psychologist
Christopher Mann* Forensic Psychologist
Chance Oberstein Attorney
James Rogan Judge
George Runner Politician
Adam Yerke Forensic Psychologist
  
 
113 
this area, and questions about legal and medical definitions and practices. Either an 
undergraduate research assistant or I transcribed all interviews, and I created a manual coding 
schema to identify and organize major themes related to treatment and the law.  
Additionally, I conducted 70 hours of participant observation over 24 months at several 
locations to analyze how legal and medical aspects of SVP law intersected. First, I observed 
meetings of the California Coalition on Sexual Offending (CCOSO). CCOSO is a sex offender 
management organization founded in 1986. Its members consist of law enforcement, criminal 
justice, mental health, probation, parole, and other community service experts working in the 
field of sexual abuse and assault. There are 12 CCOSO regional chapters throughout the state, 
most of which hold monthly meetings open to anyone working or interested in sex offender 
management. Meetings provide trainings on new and relevant research, usually by bringing in 
guest speakers. CCOSO also publishes resources related to sex offender management, such as 
guidelines for treatment provision and information on new and relevant sex offender legislation. 
The majority of CCOSO meetings I attended were with the Los Angeles South Chapter, housed 
at the Chicago School of Professional Psychiatry in downtown Los Angeles. Topics for meetings 
included stalking, polygraph examinations, multicultural sex offender treatment, and changing 
categories of offending as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), which contains descriptions, symptoms, and other criteria for diagnosing mental 
disorders. Psychiatrists use these categories when diagnosing Sexually Violent Predators.  
I also observed meetings of the Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offender Laws (ACSOL), 
a nonprofit, sex offender advocacy organization founded in 2011 that provides legal guidance 
and emotional support for “registered citizens” (the organization’s term for individuals on the 
sex offender registry) and their families. The Executive Director of the organization is Janice 
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Bellucci, a civil rights lawyer who both litigates sex offender cases and lobbies for or against 
legislation related to sex offending in the state. ACSOL holds monthly meetings around the state, 
some of which take place in Los Angeles at an office space rented from the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Southern California (ACLU SoCal). I attended LA meetings in person. In 
addition, I listened to conference call access and recordings of meetings held in San Diego, 
Berkeley, and Sacramento, which are available for all meetings. Topics for ACSOL meetings 
address mainly legal and practical issues that registrants face—in particular, how to effectively 
comply with parole and travel restrictions and information on new legislation or aspects of 
legislation that may impact the lives of registrants. Meetings also provide a space for convicted 
sex offenders to speak about their experiences and the difficulties they face. This includes how 
their convictions have impacted their lives, the lives of their families, and the lives of their 
victims. 
Neither CCOSO nor ACSOL focuses exclusively on SVPs, SVP treatment, or SVP 
legislation—there are no groups in the state that do. However, each group’s work overlaps with 
legal and medical issues impacting SVPs—sometimes directly (such as CCOSO’s published 
informational guide on SVP legislation and treatment practices), and sometimes more 
peripherally (a board member of ACSOL is a former SVP). More broadly, these groups address 
the intersection of treatment and law, and are thus valuable sources of information about the 
categorization processes surrounding sexually deviant behavior. I became an active and 
transparent member of both groups, joining their e-mail list serves, introducing myself to the 
individuals running meetings, and eventually presenting my own work (related to media 
coverage of sex offenders). While at meetings, I took extensive field notes for all observations, 
and conducted informal interviews, for which I obtained oral consent. These interviews 
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functioned more like informal conversations, which I would either take notes on while they 
occurred, or no more than ten minutes after the conversation finished. I also conducted content 
analysis of CCOSO and ACSOL resources, publications, and additional documents that were 
handed out during meetings and posted on their websites. 
Finally, in order to examine the institutional contexts surrounding treatment, I analyzed 
primary documents relating to the California Department of Mental Health and Coalinga State 
Hospital, including a 2015 state audit of California’s Sex Offender Commitment Program and a 
2019 State Hospital Budget Report. These documents provided firsthand information on the 
staffing, treatment, finances, and general institutional structure of Coalinga State Hospital. 
 
FINDINGS  
My results demonstrate that three interconnected factors transform treatment into 
punishment. First, institutional inefficiencies, such as staffing shortages and treatment 
inconsistencies, make accessing and successfully completing treatment at Coalinga almost 
impossible. The low status and stigma invoked by the sexual predator label exacerbates these 
institutional issues, leading to emotional barriers, such as fear and disgust, that undermine the 
usefulness or need for treatment. Finally, 3) medical and clinical priorities become subordinated 
to legal and punitive priorities in the SVP framework: as medical actors respond to legal 
mandates, the meaning and experience of treatment is increasingly defined and shaped by 
punitive changes in law and policy. I discuss each of these findings in more detail below. 
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Institutional inefficiencies: staffing, unclear standards, and poor treatment 
My data demonstrate several institutional factors that act as barriers to treatment. First, 
severe staff shortages contribute to shortages in availability and consistency of treatment offered. 
Leesl Herman, who runs several sex offender treatment clinics states, “Coalinga has been an 
interesting thing to watch. I mean they built this multimillion dollar facility…and it just didn’t 
occur to them that maybe building it in this horrible God-forsaken part of California was going to 
make it challenging for people to staff...” Various clinicians and lawyers interviewed mentioned 
that the institution struggles with treatment class availability, widely varying quality of 
treatment, and high staff turnover, which can force patients to have to restart treatment modules 
(the sequential levels of therapy through which they must progress to complete treatment). 
Turnover, amongst other issues, can create mistrust between patients and treatment 
providers. Christina Behle, a Los Angeles County Public Defender who represents patients at 
Coalinga, discusses how treatment is crowded, and her clients often sit on waitlists for years 
before they are able to access modules. Once they enter into a module, lack of uniform treatment 
standards means that the quality of classes is uneven: She states, “They repeat the same stuff 
over and over again. I review their records to prepare for trial, and a lot of it is the same, just cut 
and paste. Their annual goals are the same. Their quarterlies are the same. I just think they could 
do a lot better.”  
The 2015 California State audit of California’s Sex Offender Commitment Program 
supports these sentiments, stating that, between 2012 and 2014, Coalinga offered no training at 
all for SVP evaluators. The institution also reduced professional qualifications necessary for 
certain evaluators in order to address “recruitment challenges” resulting from Coalinga’s 
secluded location. The report indicates that Coalinga is approximately five staff members short 
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to fill the desired number of forensic evaluator, case management, and data tracking positions (in 
each category). The acting chief of forensic services at Coalinga confirmed understaffing, as well 
as a backlog of patient evaluations (261 as of December 2014). The report also found that the 
institution lacked clear and comprehensive treatment protocol and guidelines. 
Experts also point out problems with the risk-assessment instruments used to assess 
patients. They point out that the Static-99, for example, does not take into account behavioral 
changes in offenders based on how or whether they comply with treatment. Subsequently, 
patients’ responses to treatment (however successful) do not change their Static-99 scores. Dr. 
Adam Yerke, a licensed psychologist who works with High Risk Sex Offenders (HRSO’s) and 
as an SVP evaluation contractor, states: “[The Static-99] is helpful for understanding who’s high 
versus low [risk], but it doesn’t really tell us who’s getting better or worse…we can do treatment 
for 10 years, [but if you’ve still got five victims]…you can’t change [the Static-99 test score].” 
Dr. Malinek adds, “[The Static-99] overlooks individual characteristics, it does not assess 
change, it does not include all relevant risk factors, it does not address dynamic risk factors, it 
does not address treatment…It’s not the end of risk assessment, it’s the beginning.” Each doctor 
points out that sole reliance on this test to evaluate patients is thus incomplete. 
Yet, while dynamic risk assessment models exist that would allow evaluators to take into 
account changes and response to treatment over time, the 2015 Sex Offender Commitment 
Program audit indicates that Coalinga and other state hospitals only began to offer training on 
such assessments instruments in 2015. In prior trainings, they provided a brief overview of such 
risk instruments without instructions on how to use them. This type of institutional inertia may 
explain in part why most evaluators continue to almost exclusively use the Static-99 when 
writing up evaluations and testifying in SVP trials. In Ronald Rogers’ SVP trial, which took 
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place in 2017, both testifying psychiatrists used the Static-99 to evaluate and demonstrate 
evidence of Rogers’ sexual psychopathy. Each argued that Rogers was a high-risk of reoffending 
based on his Static-99 score, and did not discuss any other sorts of indicators with which they 
evaluated Rogers.  
Dr. Malinek justifies the continued use of these diagnostic measures by asserting that 
legal experts should have the capacity to understand their limitations. He states, “The law must 
be aware of the limitations of psychiatry. There are tools that the law has to assess science...The 
law or the legal decision should know that the Static-99 has only moderate predictive 
accuracy…the legal system should know that.” He shifts responsibility onto legal actors who 
“should know” how to interpret clinical evaluations and results. At the same time, Malinek 
expresses concern and acknowledgement that jurors do not understand actuarial measures: “I see 
jurors falling asleep when I talk about statistical prediction…Is it fair to expect a juror with a 
high-school education and a lot of good intentions to really understand positive predictive 
power? Risk-factor analysis? Correlation?” Regardless, experts continue to use these tools. 
In addition to barriers created through the use of the Static-99, the confessional nature of 
treatment modules also creates barriers to treatment. Patients must admit past crimes as part of 
programs and group therapy, but can be charged with new crimes if such admissions indicate that 
they have offended against victims or committed incidents yet unknown—this is called the 
“paradox of disclosure.” As one clinician points out, “[Disclosure] opens you up to legal 
[vulnerability], but you only progress in treatment if you disclose.” Many lawyers defending 
SVPs thus advise them not to participate in treatment, as a means of protecting them from 
additional charges. 
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Unsurprisingly, treatment providers disagree with this strategy and support engaging in 
treatment. They also argue that abstaining from treatment programming does not always work in 
the legal favor of Coalinga patients. Dr. Mann states, “[When SVPs don’t engage] in treatment, 
they are viewed as more of a high risk to the courts, to the judges, to the lawyer…a jury is not 
going to decide to let [an SVP] out if they see they are not participating in treatment.” Los 
Angeles Superior Court Judge James Dabney further adds that not participating in treatment 
reduces the number of protective factors (conditions considered to mitigate the risk of 
reoffending) available to SVPs on trial. This puts SVPs in a type of double bind, wherein either 
abstaining from treatment or participating in it can have negative repercussions. 
Supporting this viewpoint, the prosecutor in Ronald Rogers’ SVP trial used Rogers’ 
refusal to participate in treatment as evidence of why he should remain at Coalinga, saying to the 
jury, “[Rogers] went to the hospital in 1996. Since that point he has done nothing to work on his 
diagnoses. He has had access to the best treatments, and he has no interest.” Dr. Bruce 
Yanovsky, one of the court-appointed experts who evaluated Ronald Rogers at Coalinga and 
testified for the prosecution in the trial, added: “These [pathological sexual] behaviors are 
chronic, and there is no reason to believe they’ve gone away. I believe in treatment. In the 
absence of treatment, there is no reason to believe anything can change.” Christina Behle, who 
often advises her clients at Coalinga not to participate in treatment, said that juries often 
disregard or brush aside treatment objections, telling her, “if he’s refusing to treat, we don’t trust 
him.”  
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Emotional barriers: stigma, mistrust, and fear of responsibility 
The low status of and stigma associated with SVPs exacerbate these bureaucratic and 
institutional issues. Cecelia Groman, a California CONREP employee (the organization 
responsible for supervising high-risk sex offenders after release) highlights how negative 
feelings about violent sex offenders can contribute to staffing issues: “Well trained individuals 
often don’t want to deal with [SVPs]…How do you treat rapists and their fantasies about 
previous victims when you’ve had victims in your office crying and screaming about the horrible 
torture and abuse that they [have faced]?”  
Many people often simply do not believe that treatment can be effective or useful. Dr. 
Yerke points out, “People don’t understand that there are treatment procedures that actually 
work.” Janice Bellucci, a civil rights lawyer, adds, “I had a judge one time (this was in Long 
Beach superior court), who told me, ‘once a sex offender, always a sex offender. They always do 
it again. There is no cure.’” The prosecutor in Ronald Rogers’ SVP trial said SVP diagnoses are, 
“Lifelong and chronic, part of your personality, they define who you are,” and described Rogers’ 
as having an “entrenched nature” as a predator. This type of statement directly undermines 
treatment, and demonstrates the stigma associated with the SVP label as well as the sex offender 
label more broadly. 
Narratives questioning the efficacy of treatment and reinforcing the incurability of SVPs 
arise often in discussions of civil commitment. Chance Oberstein, a lawyer who helps sex 
offenders remove their names from the California registry, points out that SVPs are “different” 
than other offenders: “They’re not susceptible to treatment, and the only way to deter them from 
doing what they’ve set out to do in their lives is to confine them to the warehouse.” Leesl 
Herman states similarly: 
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Civil commitment seems to fly in the face of what we believe as a nation, [but] there are 
definitely human beings who are too dangerous to be in our communities. We don’t want 
to kill them, so we need to put them someplace…they can’t walk among us. We won’t be 
safe from them. 
Interestingly, Herman relates this need for civil commitment to the lack of treatment that SVPs 
receive in prison:  
Some guys…spend 19 years in prison and they’re ready to be released back into the 
community on parole. But their behavior is so dangerous and they have received no 
treatment inside. They’ve probably even developed criminal behaviors that are just going 
to make them more dangerous out on the streets.  
In these contexts, SVPs constitute a unique type of stigmatized sex offender, one that is beyond 
treatment and beyond reintegration into society. This is the case for several reasons: because of 
the entrenched, violent “nature” of SVPs, the antisocial behaviors SVPs acquire while in prison, 
and even because they received no treatment while in prison. 
When SVPs do participate actively in treatment at Coalinga, treatment providers can 
doubt the veracity of their statements and dismiss their participation. Dr. Christopher Mann, a 
clinical SVP evaluator who has worked at Coalinga State hospital, states about his patients: 
SVPs are masters of psychological warfare…they try to manipulate treatment providers 
or very skilled psychologists or interns to look good. If you’re doing an assessment on 
them you have to constantly be on your guard, because they're definitely trying to show 
to you that they don’t belong there…they’re going to want to ‘fake good’ that they no 
longer have those inclinations and they no longer have those urges. 
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Dr. Malinek expresses similar sentiments about SVP evaluation interviews, adding, “We give 
very circumscribed weight for interviews in a forensic setting. Any SVP, including one who has 
agreed to see you, has an understandable investment in presenting themselves positively. They 
may simply lie throughout the interview.” These statements suggest that if patients at Coalinga 
cooperate with treatment and evaluation, it may not necessarily matter for their forward progress, 
contributing to notions of “incurability” and treatment futility from both a doctor and a patient 
perspective. 
Another barrier to participating in treatment is fear of discrimination. This applies 
primarily to patients at Coalinga who have committed crimes against children. As one ACSOL 
meeting participant stated, “Everyone hates a child molester.” According to several interview 
respondents, although patients at Coalinga have committed a broad range of sexual offenses, 
pedophiles occupy the lowest social status there, mimicking “prison-like” hierarchies wherein 
they may face physical and sexual violence from other patients. For example, Dr. Mann states of 
his Coalinga patients:  
[They] don’t want other [patients] to know they’re child molesters, and are oftentimes are 
segregated [because] rapists will harm [patients] who have a history of child molestation 
offenses…Of all the offenders I've worked with, the ones that are the most stigmatized 
are the ones that are genuine pedophiles. 
Thus, even within an environment consisting entirely of people categorized as high-risk sexual 
predators, patients distinguish between themselves according to crime—with crimes against 
children occupying the lowest rung of the ladder. Christina Behle, a Los Angeles County Public 
Defender who represents various patients at Coalinga, points out that this hierarchy acts as a 
barrier to treatment. Because treatment requires the discussion of past crimes in front of a mixed 
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group of patients (i.e., not all pedophiles), pedophiles may decline to participate in order to 
minimize stigma and discrimination from other patients at the hospital. 
 Finally, fear of responsibility acts a treatment barrier. Treatment providers and lawyers 
are afraid of signing someone off as “rehabilitated” and then having that person commit another 
crime, lest they bear the resultant responsibility. Dr. Yerke states: “…nobody is ever going to 
say, ‘okay. I think they’re cured.’ Nobody wants to sign off on that, right? You’d [say they were 
done with treatment] and then they go reoffend or something.” He goes on to further explain 
that: 
Even when you use all your risk instruments, you can’t fully predict the future. So 
somebody could look like a really good candidate [for release], and I can’t say ‘no’ just 
out of my fear…But that’s not to say that they’re not going to go out and offend again, 
[and] I don’t want to have my name on the news as the one who signed off on the report 
to release them. 
Thus, fear plays a role throughout evaluative processes.  
Cecelia Groman also mentions that fear often influences the decisions of legal and 
political actors involved in SVP proceedings:  
…Politicians [and judges] worry about losing their jobs if they’re not tough on crime and 
tough on sex offenses…it doesn’t really matter what the treatment people say…[But, 
often] these laws make it harder on the offenders. You can’t find a place to live. Nobody 
will hire you. How does that make you less risky?” 
Legal and political actors’ perceived obligations to the public, and perceptions of how the public 
may view “sympathy” towards sex offenders, can thus influence decision-making in this area. 
Such concerns extend to juries, as well, who can feel a responsibility to err on the side of 
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caution even if offenders complete treatment. Essentially, in order to release an SVP, jurors have 
to unanimously agree that the offender has changed or no longer possesses the mental health 
diagnosis under which they were originally designated an SVP. Dr. Mann points out that this is 
difficult for jurors to do. Dr. Malinek adds: “it is a challenge for jurors to be intellectually honest 
[in SVP cases], and I think in sex cases particularly, the emotionally evocative element is a 
problem.” Similarly, when talking with jurors after the verdict in the SVP trial I observed, they 
made several comments that alluded to the responsibility they bore to “protect” future victims, to 
make sure that the defendant did not go out into the world and offend again. Dr. Malinek adds 
that, amongst jurors, “there’s often an assumption that [if] you were an SVP, you’re forever an 
SVP…but a lot of people I see were SVPs and no longer are. They may have changed, they may 
have aged, they may have been treated…and I think that jurors often don’t understand...” 
 
The subordination of medical and clinical priorities to legal and punitive priorities  
In addition to institutional and emotional barriers, medical and clinical priorities become 
subordinated to legal and punitive priorities in the SVP framework in ways that shift the meaning 
and experience of treatment towards punishment. The law maintains a hierarchical position over 
medicine in sex offender civil commitment, defining the sexually predatory and expecting that 
medicine respond to those legal definitions and parameters. Yet medicine and law have different 
concerns. While medicine is oriented towards diagnosis and treatment, the law asks medical 
evaluators to predict future dangerousness. According to Dr. Mann, “…dangerousness at present 
is diagnostic and we’re called upon by the courts to be prognostic. [But] we can’t predict the 
future. We can only do our best…the legal system is requiring us to do more than our job.” He 
adds that, “my report has to answer a legal question and I don’t get to determine what the legal 
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question is.” Ultimately, courts, and not clinicians, make decisions about SVP treatment—
clinicians only make recommendations to the courts. 
The law in this case can also dictate medical diagnoses and practices. First, the law may 
force certain diagnostic categories on offenders. For example, California law defines a child as 
anyone under the age of 14. According to Dr. Malinek, this means that a 17-year old who has 
consensual sex with a girlfriend who is 13 years and 11 months old could be legally prosecuted 
as a pedophile, without meeting the diagnostic criteria for that category. From this perspective, 
“anyone who had sex with a minor could be prosecuted. We could put the entire legal 
community in prison for having had sex before the age of 18, which they usually do.”  
Additionally, the law shifts traditional medical obligations. While doctors usually 
consider themselves obligated to their patients, Dr. Mann points out that, in the case of SVP 
evaluations, “[Doctors] have two clients—obviously the patient, but, when we’re doing sex 
offender treatment, also the courts.” This creates competing obligations for medical 
professionals, who must perform both an ethical duty to protect and treat their patients and to 
protect the public—obligations that often directly conflict.  
Because of these competing obligations, evaluators wind up serving in a “quasi-judicial” 
role, rather than providing objective medical information. SVP evaluations utilize legal 
terminology, and the law impacts both sex offender actuarial risk measures and treatment 
procedures. During Ronald Rogers’ SVP trial, the defense attorney questioned medical expert 
Dr. Robert Owen about his report language, “[In your report], are you giving us legislative terms, 
or medical terms? Are you using medical terms, or terms you’ve gotten from the statute?” Owens 
responded, “I use both.” Owens did go on to use both, at one point quoting the legal statute 
verbatim by explaining to the prosecutor that Rogers “posed a substantial risk” to society, 
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according to his evaluation. Christina Behle also points out how the law impacts actuarial tools 
used by medical providers. The Static-99 test takes into account number of prior offenses, 
meaning that if offenders are charged with multiple crimes, which they frequently are, those 
charges factor into and raise their overall score or degree of dangerousness. In both of these 
ways, legal factors dictate medical diagnoses. 
Further demonstrating this dynamic, CCOSO meetings focus almost exclusively on 
introducing and managing current diagnostic procedures and categories, most of which are 
introduced via new laws and regulations, but rarely question the introduction of these 
procedures. For example, one meeting brought in a polygraph expert to discuss how to integrate 
polygraphy into treatment, as the law now mandates polygraph testing for various sex offenses. 
The resultant discussion touched upon the legal ramifications of polygraphs, how they impact 
disclosure to parole officers, and how clinicians should respond legally if patients fail the test 
(CCOSO Riverside, January 12, 2016). Individual clinicians may have more nuanced views of 
the treatment tools required by law (for example, Dr. Yerke spoke at length about the way he 
uses polygraphs in treatment to hold patients accountable for their actions), yet such tools remain 
mandated by contact or law, leaving clinicians with little choice but to integrate them. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Legal and medical literature opposed to SVP laws argues that they are punishment 
disguised as treatment, yet does not demonstrate how treatment processes in this domain come to 
constitute punishment. I find that a number of institutional and social processes contribute to this 
transformation, including institutional disfunction, stigma and labeling, and unequal authority 
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between medicine and law. In tandem, these factors ensure that treatment functions punitively 
and cannot be “successful.”  
 
Treatment Paradoxes and Institutional Disfunction 
My results demonstrate how different institutional inefficiencies act as barriers to 
treatment. As legal and medical actors navigate the paradox of disclosure (Miller 2010) they 
have conflicting perspectives about treatment participation. Clinicians I interviewed recognize 
this paradox, but expect patients to participate in treatment, anyway. Furthermore, clinician 
statements, trial testimony, and comments from Judge James Dabney show how treatment non-
participation can be used as evidence of continued pathology. This suggests that patients may 
face an additional paradox—both disclosure and nondisclosure can jeopardize their chances for 
release, creating a double-bind wherein any treatment response negatively impacts offenders. 
When representing SVP clients, Christina Behle often advises her clients to decline treatment, 
despite recognizing that juries often hold this against them, indicating that some legal actors still 
find the potential costs of disclosure to be greater than treatment non-participation. 
Experts in the study also critique the Static-99 actuarial test as a measure for treatment 
progress, pointing out that patients can go through years of treatment that do not change their 
Static-99 score. But they nonetheless continue to use this test, despite the existence of more 
dynamic risk assessment models, and while acknowledging that jurors likely understand neither 
the test nor its limitations. Continued use of the Static-99 may partially stem from institutional 
factors, such as lack of training on other risk assessment tools.  
Other her institutional limitations delay and prevent access to treatment, as well. These 
include understaffing, general reluctance to work in a setting with high risk sex offenders, lack of 
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training, and lack of clear treatment guidelines. My interviews with clinicians and lawyers 
illustrate the ways that these institutional issues delay or block treatment, acting not only as 
treatment disincentives, but in some cases actually making treatment unavailable to patients for 
long periods of time. If treatment is actually unavailable to patients, civil commitment becomes 
indefinite confinement alone, demonstrating punitive impact, if not intent. Coalinga’s 
institutional issues also suggest that state money allocated to its budget may be inefficiently 
allotted and spent (Janus 2000). 
 
 
The Impact of SVP Labeling and Stigma on Diagnosis, Treatment, and Evaluation 
 
Adding to existing work that explores how the medical diagnosis of sexual predator acts 
as a form of labeling that results in dehumanization and rights-deprivation (Douard 2008, 
Halperin and Hoppe 2017), labeling negatively impacts SVP treatment processes and 
evaluations. Assigning SVP diagnosis implies a type of pathological identity that makes 
treatment seem futile, regardless of its supposed or actual effectiveness. Belief that treatment is 
futile for some offenders both justifies their confinement and excuses treatment inadequacies. 
The lack of treatment that SVPs receive while serving criminal sentences further demonstrates 
and supports their entrenched pathological nature, indicating that they are “beyond” treatment 
before they even arrive at Coalinga.   
In line with research that labeling may reduce the likelihood of helping behavior 
(Corrigan and Matthews 2003), this label creates stigma within treatment programs—personal 
feelings about SVPs impact staffing and treatment experiences at Coalinga. When SVPs actively 
comply with and participate in treatment, clinicians often dismiss their perspectives and 
participation, deeming them “untrustworthy” or “manipulative.” While this may in fact be the 
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case, it further undermines treatment compliance and efficacy. My results also demonstrate that 
stigma may negatively impact the treatment experiences of SVPs by causing fear or hesitation to 
participate, particularly amongst patients who are pedophiles. These results add valuable 
information about SVPs to existing studies on stigma in sex offender treatment (Jahnke and 
Hoyer 2013). In particular, they demonstrate that, even within an already stigmatized category, 
hierarchies of offending persist that create additional barriers to treatment and negative treatment 
experiences for some offenders. 
The labeling and stigma of SVPs also creates fear of responsibility amongst legal and 
medical actors that discourage them from accepting the validity of treatment completion. 
Competing obligations exist between evaluating treatment success and “protecting” the public 
that make it difficult for judges and jurors in particular to make unbiased judgements. This study 
adds observations from an actual SVP trial to existing work in this area using trial simulation 
(Lieberman and Krauss 2009, Scurich and Krauss 2014) and adds to existing findings that 
medically labeling sexual pathologies can impact trial outcomes as much or more than actual 
trial-related factors (Konecni, Mulcahy, and Ebbesen 1980).  
 
Differences in Medical-Legal Priorities, Expectations, and Power 
Finally, existing work suggests that, in SVP cases, scientific calculations become 
reworked into legal logics as courts use these logics to justify civil commitment (Vogler 2018), 
my results show several of the processes through which this occurs. First, to comply with civil 
commitment statutes, clinicians shift from diagnosis to prognosis, and, in so doing, broaden their 
ethical obligations to include public safety, as well as patients. These changes fundamentally 
alter the dynamics of treatment and evaluation, moving it in the direction of dangerousness 
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prevention. Clinicians must also respond to legal authority and changing laws by adjusting their 
treatment and evaluation models, as we see in the case of polygraphy and shifting age of consent, 
and by the way in which the law impacts actuarial tests such as the Static-99.  
While clinicians express feeling pulled by competing obligations between medicine and 
law, they largely comply with legal expectations. They justify this compliance with their own 
expectations of the law’s responsibility to understand the limitations of their expertise, and by 
emphasizing their role as recommenders and evaluators, rather than legal decision-makers. This 
could be a type of distancing—recognizing the problematic components of their role, they 
minimize its importance (Goffman 2009). They can also find ways to exert their authority or 
push back on legal guidelines, such as using mandated tools in ways more aligned with medical 
logics, as we see with Dr. Yerke in the case of polygraphy. 
These results demonstrate the processes through which medical compliance with legal 
guidelines may shift medical treatment and evaluation in an overall punitive direction. While 
prevailing literature tends to discuss how medical discourse defines social problems (Orr 2006), 
the sociology of diagnosis in this instance demonstrates the ways that legal discourse and 
authority continuously shape how treatment operates across the bodies of SVP patients (Fischel 
2016). Of course, clinicians do not have to conduct SVP evaluation and treatment—they choose 
to do so for significant financial compensation, often in addition to full time jobs seeing other 
patients (see Ewing 2011), indicating that they certainly bear some responsibility for 
perpetuating a system that they recognize is flawed.  
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CONCLUSION 
I cannot generalize my findings beyond this study, as they represent only a small number 
of providers and legal actors within the state of California. However, they provide a starting 
point from which sociologists can begin to explore some the processes surrounding sex offender 
incapacitation and treatment, and why it is often ineffective. Future work should address how 
treatment processes vary by state law and amount of funding, which undoubtedly impact 
institutional functioning and interactions with medical professionals. In addition, despite several 
attempts, I was unable to obtain visitation access to Coalinga State Hospital. Doctor-patient 
confidentiality, combined with the security and regulations of a locked facility such as Coalinga, 
make observing SVP treatment sites and procedures extremely difficult, if not impossible. Yet 
such observation can add valuable information to understanding treatment barriers.  
I did not discuss treatment with SVPs themselves, partially due to these access issues. 
Because so few SVPs have been released, and those that are remain under strict surveillance and 
security regulations, this is also extremely difficult. While potentially valuable, interviewing 
SVPs has mixed implications—as results of this study indicate, they likely have a vested interest 
in portraying themselves positively and in critiquing treatment—they are unlikely to express 
neutral opinions about the topics addressed here. Still, their experiences of treatment are 
certainly relevant to discussions such as these, and research should attempt to find ways to 
integrate their perspectives. 
Despite these limitations, the results of this study show empirically what others often 
theorize, but do not demonstrate. Opponents of SVP laws argue that they constitute punishment 
under the guise of treatment based on broad legal, medical, and ethical explanations (Douard 
2008, Janus 2006, Testa and West 2010), without showing the processes through which they 
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function as punishment. Demonstrating the myriad institutional and interpersonal interactions 
that create barriers to treatment verifies these theoretical objections and illustrates that, 
regardless of intention; legal, institutional, and social factors may make it impossible for SVP 
laws to function in any other way besides punishment. 
This has important and new implications for understanding the integration of therapeutic 
discourses and logics into law. Like many other individuals within treatment programs, sexual 
predators are a “social problem” (Sweet 2018). Yet, unlike other social problems (for example 
domestic violence victims, welfare recipients, drug addicts, etc.), sexual predators are perceived 
as beyond rehabilitation before they enter treatment—this identity is overarching and all-
encompassing. Treatment processes simply solidify this identity (Haney 2010)—sexual predators 
are a social problem that society does not want to solve. 
This is of particular concern as the SVP template of preventative detention (Prentky et al. 
2006) begins to be applied to other “undesirable” groups. In June of 2019, Los Angeles County 
and city officials called for a reconsideration of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (which, in 1972, 
ended the involuntary lifetime commitment of most individuals with mental illness in the state) 
suggesting that the city alter the Act to allow for the involuntarily commitment of “chronically 
homeless” individuals with mental illness (Contributing Editor 2019). Similarly, a proposed 
2020 ballot measure aimed at the homeless population of California suggests assigning special 
courts to determine whether economic need, drug use or addiction, or mental health issues 
caused individuals to commit crimes (Ballotpedia 2019). With the assistance of two experts, 
these courts will determine whether individuals are potential harms to themselves because of 
mental health issues, and mandatorily commit them to mental health facilities if so. These cases 
demonstrate how the SVP template is already being used to regulate other “social problems.” 
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While treatment will undoubtedly vary in new contexts, my results indicate several of the ways 
that it will likely punish and marginalize, regardless. 
Overall, this study demonstrates how medical-legal interactions, both institutional and 
interpersonal, can shape treatment environments in punitive ways. As the therapeutic discourse 
of SVP laws expands to other populations, we must continue to examine how treatment serves as 
both a mechanism and a justification for the exclusion of “unsolvable” social problems. 
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